




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Anselm of Canterbury

" THEOLOGICAL TREATISES "

VOLUME III

" V.3 "

"P
765
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E57
V.3"

editors: Jasper Hopkins
Herbert Richardson

Thomas J. Coyle Library
TRENT UNIVERSITY
PETERBOROUGH, ONTARIO

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Printed in the
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Cambridge

Harvard Divinity School Library

B765-A82 E57 V.3

Anselm of Canterbury

- I. ON THE VIRGIN CONCEPTION AND ORIGINAL SIN
(De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato)
- II. ON THE HARMONY OF THE FOREKNOWLEDGE, THE PREDESTINATION, AND
THE GRACE OF GOD WITH FREE CHOICE
(De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis
et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio)

Translated by

Douglas Johnson

G. Stanley Kane

Raymond Phyles

Charles Waldrop

in collaboration with the editors

74813

EDITORS' FOREWORD

This volume contains the remaining previously untranslated treatises of Anselm of Canterbury. Both treatises postdate the Cur Deus Homo, being written in the last decade of Anselm's life. Both are characterized by a conceptual richness and a balanced discussion of a range of interrelated theological and philosophical issues. In fact, in these last essays Anselm seems to be moving away from the topical, or loci, method toward the development of genuine systematics.

On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin is the first treatise in this volume. It was written about 1099-1100, immediately upon the completion of the Cur Deus Homo. Anselm regards On the Virgin Conception as a proper sequel to this more famous work, and begins by addressing Boso, his interlocutor:

You have read in the Cur Deus Homo (which you above all others urged me to write and in which I have cast you as my fellow disputant) that there is yet another argument which can be given to show the way in which God took from among the sinful mass of the human race a man who had no sin. (CDH, Bk. 2, Ch. 27) Now, when you read this, I am sure that your alert mind was in no small degree aroused to ask what the argument is . . . For nothing prevents there being several different arguments, any one of which is sufficient to establish the same conclusion.

That Anselm did not regard the argument in the Cur Deus Homo as his sole, or perhaps even decisive, answer to this question has not been sufficiently observed. Certainly his commentators have badly neglected the chronological and textual relations between his two essays which seek an explanation for the incarnation.

The second treatise in this volume, On the Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice, was written in 1107-08. This is the last of Anselm's writings, and it fittingly summarizes and crowns his literary production. Here Anselm draws together his earlier philosophical analyses of truth and free choice and his later theological reflections on grace and the work of Jesus Christ. Rather than breaking new ground in this treatise, he exhibits the intrinsic unity of the arguments and distinctions found in his earlier writings. Only when one considers that Anselm's final writing was not retractiones, but the harmonization of his previous reflections on various topics, does one appreciate the magnitude of his life's work. For Anselm no less than Augustine was involved in polemics throughout his life and his thought shows the same constant development; but Anselm was the more rigorous and precise thinker, never allowing polemics of the moment to force him into compensatory overstatement. As a result, the end of his life was not a time for retractions; rather, it was an occasion for showing that his earlier reflections were capable of--indeed demanded--presentation as an intrinsic unity. There is in Anselm's thought, therefore, not only a tendency toward the late medieval summa, but even the modern system. These later modes of theological work would not have seemed utterly strange to him.

The treatises in this volume, like those in the previous volume, were originally translated by students in a Harvard seminar in the Explication of Latin Theological Texts. Since that time, they have been completely reworked by the editors themselves, who have thereafter consulted carefully with the original translators in order to arrive at a reading which is satisfactory to all. Though the present versions are not yet in final form, they are perhaps accurate enough to be of use to others. Eventually, revised versions of the contents of this and the second volume in this series will be published in a Harper and Row Torchbook as a companion to the editors' Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues.

Mrs. Richard Arnold shared major responsibilities with us in preparing this and the previous volume. Not only did she type and proofread several versions of these treatises, but, even more importantly, she organized our schedule of work in the production of the final mats. You, dear reader, would not be reading this except for her.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge the continuing assistance of Miss Charlene Harris in the completion of all three volumes in this series. To her and to those many others at Harvard who have aided us--often at some real inconvenience to themselves--we give our thanks.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 13, 1967

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ON THE VIRGIN CONCEPTION AND ORIGINAL SIN

(De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato)

ON THE VIRGIN CONCEPTION AND ORIGINAL SIN

Prologue

Since I am willing to accommodate your religious desire on all matters insofar as I am able, brother and most beloved son Boso, then I certainly count myself especially indebted when I understand that such a desire is aroused in you by me. You have read in the Cur Deus Homo (which you above all others urged me to write and in which I have cast you as my fellow disputant) that there is yet another argument which can be given to show the way in which God took from among the sinful mass of the human race a man who had no sin. (CDH, Bk. 2, Ch. 27) Now, when you read this I am sure that your alert mind was in no small degree aroused to ask what the argument is. For this reason I fear that I may seem unjust to you if I conceal from you, my dear friend, what thoughts I have on this matter. So I shall briefly present my views in order that I may not reject the right opinion of anyone on this topic or uncritically maintain my own opinion if it can be shown to be opposed to the truth. Still, I think that the argument presented in the Cur Deus Homo is altogether valid and sufficient if one attends to it. For nothing prevents there being several different arguments, any one of which is sufficient to establish the same conclusion.

CHAPTER I

What Original and Personal Justice and Injustice Are

In order to see, therefore, how God assumed from out of the sinful mass of the human race a man who had no sin it is necessary first to inquire about original sin, because the former question arises from the latter. For if we see that Christ could not be subject to original sin, then it will be clear how His assumption, or conception, was free from all sin.

There is no doubt that 'original' is derived from the word 'origin.' If, therefore, original sin exists only in man, it seems to get this name either (1) from the origin, or beginning, of human nature, on the ground that it is contracted at the very origin of human nature; or else (2) such a sin gets its name from the origin, or beginning, of each person, on the ground that it is contracted at the origin of each person. However, original sin does not seem to be something which derives from the beginning of human nature, since human nature was just in its origin when the first parents were created just and without any sin. Hence, original sin seems to be called 'original' from its origin in each human person. Yet if anyone says this sin is called 'original' on the ground that individuals derive it from their first parents, in whom human nature originated, I shall not contradict him--provided he does not deny that original sin is contracted at the origin of each person. Now in each man are found together both the nature by which he is a man like other men, and the person by which he is distinguished from other men--as when he is called 'this one' or 'that one,' or when he is called by his own name (e.g., 'Adam' or 'Abel'). The sin of every human being is in both his nature and his person, for the sin of Adam was in Adam the man (i.e., in his nature) and in the man 'Adam' (i.e., in his person). Yet although each man is both a nature and a person, there is a difference between the sin he contracts at the very origin of his nature and the sin which he commits after he is a person distinct from other persons. To be sure, that sin which is contracted at the origin of his nature is called 'original,' though it can also be called 'natural'--not because it is from the essence of his nature, but because it is received together with his nature on account of the nature's corruption. But the sin which each man commits after he is a person can be called 'personal,' because

it is done through the person's own fault. By means of these same considerations, we can also speak of both an original and a personal justice. For Adam and Eve were originally just; that is, they were just from the first, from the moment they existed as human beings. And justice can be called 'personal,' as when an unjust man receives justice which he did not have from his origin.

CHAPTER II

How Human Nature Was Corrupted

So if Adam and Eve had kept their original justice, then those who were born of them would also have been originally just. For Adam and Eve were originally strong and uncorrupted, having the ability always to keep justice without any difficulty. But because they sinned personally, their whole being became weakened and corrupted. For after sin, the body was like the bodies of brute animals--subject to corruption and carnal appetites; and the soul was infected with carnal feelings both because of the corruption of the body and its appetites, and because of the loss of the goods that the soul needed. And because human nature as a whole was in Adam and Eve, and because there was no human nature outside them, human nature was totally weakened and corrupted by their sin.

But in addition to the corruption which human nature incurred as a result of sin, there also remained in human nature both an obligation to have the perfect justice it had received and an obligation to make satisfaction for having deserted this justice. And just as, if it had not sinned, human nature would have reproduced itself in the form in which it was created by God [i.e., without corruption], so after it sinned human nature reproduces itself in its corrupted form. So since human nature is unable by itself either to make satisfaction for sin or to recover its lost justice, and since 'the body which is

corrupted burdens the soul' (Wis. of Sol. 9:15), so that the soul is not able even to understand justice (especially when the soul is rather weak, as in infancy or in the mother's womb), it seems necessary for the human nature which is born in infants to have both the obligation to make satisfaction for that first sin which it was always able to avoid and the obligation to have that original justice it was always able to keep. Nor is the inability of human nature in infants to discharge these obligations any excuse, for human nature brought this debt upon itself when it deserted justice in our first parents. Human nature was complete in our first parents, and so it is always under the obligation to have the ability which it received for the sake of keeping justice. Hence, original sin can be ascribed even to infants.

Let me also mention all the sins of our recent ancestors which are reckoned 'unto the third and fourth generation.' (Ex. 20:5) For although it can be debated whether or not such sins are to be understood as part of original sin, I would not wish to appear to be lightening the seriousness of original sin on account of these. So I shall regard original sin to be of such gravity that no one can show it to be even more grievous.

CHAPTER III

That Sin Exists Only in a Rational Will

However, whether all the sins of our recent ancestors are part of original sin, or whether they are something less, I think that original sin cannot be asserted to be in an infant before he has a rational will, any more than justice can be asserted to be in Adam before he was a rational man. For if Adam and Eve had begotten offspring before they sinned, justice still would not and could not have been in the seed until it was formed into a living man. If, therefore, the seed of a man is not capable of being just before it becomes

a man, then the seed is also not able to receive original sin before it becomes a man.

Certainly we should not doubt that original sin is injustice. For if every sin is injustice, and if original sin is a sin, then original sin is injustice. However, if someone says that not every sin is injustice, then he should also assert that it is possible for there to be a certain sin in someone and yet, at the same time, no injustice. But such an assertion is incredible. Moreover, someone may say that original sin is not an unqualified sin; and he may argue that the words 'original sin' are to be understood like the expression 'depicted man' [a portrait]; for a depicted man is not really a man, but only a depicted man. But from this argument, it would immediately follow that an infant, who has only original sin, is free from sin; and then the Son of the Virgin would not be the only man who was without sin both in His mother's womb and at His birth. If this were the case, then either those infants who have only original sin and die without baptism would not be condemned, or else they would be condemned without sin. But we believe neither of these alternatives. So we must conclude that every sin is injustice, that original sin is an unqualified sin, and that therefore original sin is injustice. Or again, if God condemns a man only because of his injustice, and if He condemns someone because of original sin, then it follows that original sin is nothing other than injustice. But if this is true, and if injustice is nothing other than the absence of required justice (for injustice seems to be only in a nature which does not have justice though it ought to), then original sin is clearly included in the definition of 'injustice.'

But if justice is 'uprightness of will kept for its own sake,' and if uprightness can only be in a rational nature, then even as no nature except a

rational nature can receive justice, so no nature except a rational nature is under obligation to justice. For this reason, since there can be injustice only where there ought to be justice, original sin--which is injustice--can be only in a rational nature. Now, rational nature exists only in God, in angels, and in that soul with respect to which a man is said to be rational and without which he is not a man. And since there is no original sin in God or the angels, sin exists only in man's rational soul.

We must also realize that if justice is uprightness of will kept for its own sake, then justice can be only in the will; and only the will can have injustice. For the absence of justice is called injustice only where there ought to be justice. Hence, nothing is said to be just or unjust except (1) justice itself or injustice, (2) the will, or (3) something caused by a just or unjust will. And we call men, angels, the soul, and the soul's actions either just or unjust solely with respect to the will and its volitions.

CHAPTER IV

That Nothing Is Just or Unjust in Itself Except Justice Itself
or Injustice; and That Nothing Is Punished Except the Will

For nothing--whether it be a substance, or an action, or anything else--is considered to be just in itself except justice, or considered to be unjust and sinful except injustice. This applies even to the will itself, in which justice and injustice exist. For the will and justice are not identical. The former is that power of soul by which the soul wills something, and which can be called 'the instrument of willing' just as sight is called 'the instrument of seeing.' And the latter is that whose possession makes the will just, and whose absence makes the will unjust. Moreover the affections and uses of this instrument are also called 'wills,' but this distinction is too detailed to discuss here.

Those appetites which the Apostle calls both 'the flesh which lusts against the spirit' and 'the law of sin which is in our members, warring against the law of our mind' (Gal. 5.17: Rom. 7:25), are not considered just or unjust in themselves. For in themselves they do not make a man who has them either just or unjust, but they make him unjust only if he consents to them when he ought not. For the same Apostle says, 'There is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh' (Rom. 8:1), that is, to those who do not give willing consent to the flesh. For if having these appetites, even without consenting to them, constitutes injustice, then a man would be condemned merely for having them. And so we see that it is not sin to have these appetites, but is only sin to consent to them [when one ought not]. Moreover, if the appetites were intrinsically unjust, then every consenting to them would constitute injustice. But brute animals are not called unjust when they consent to them. Or again, if the appetites were sins, they would be removed by baptism, which washes away every sin. But this clearly does not occur. Therefore, there is no injustice in the essence of the appetites, but only in a rational will which complies with them inordinately. For when the will resists them by delighting in the law of God according to the inward man, then the will is just. For the Apostle calls the justice which the law commands 'the law of God,' because it is from God; and he also calls justice 'the law of the mind,' because it is known by the mind--just as the old law is called 'the law of God,' because it is from God, and also called 'the law of Moses,' because it was made known through Moses.

I have said that no action is to be called unjust in itself, but only on account of an unjust will. This is plain in the case of certain acts which can be done at times and not be unjust; for example, killing a man (as Phinehas

did) or sexual intercourse (as within ~~marriage~~ or among brute animals). But there are other actions whose injustice seems more difficult to ascribe simply to an unjust will inasmuch as they are always unjust; for example, perjury and certain other things which ought not be named. Now, consider a certain sinful action which exists only while it is doing something and which ceases after it has accomplished this thing; or consider a sinful work which has been done and which remains after the act of doing it has ceased. (For example, when someone writes something which he ought not, the writing remains even after the act of writing it has ceased.) If it were the case that an action were sinful in itself, then when the action ceased and no longer existed, sin would also cease; or if it were the case that a work were sinful in itself, then as long as the work remained, sin would also remain. But we see that sins are often not eliminated even when sinful actions are eliminated, and we see that sins are sometimes eliminated even when sinful works are not eliminated. For this reason, neither an action which ceases nor a work which remains is ever sin in itself.

Finally, if our members and our senses are blamed for their execution of voluntary actions, then they can reply: "God subjected us and the power that is in us to the will, so that we cannot keep from moving ourselves when the will commands and cannot keep from doing what it wills. For the will moves us as if we were its instruments, and it does the works which we seem to do. We cannot resist it by our own strength, nor can the works which it does be prevented by us. And neither can nor ought we refuse to obey the will, for God has appointed it to be our master. When we obey the will, we are obeying God who ordained this law for us." Therefore, how can the members or the senses or their works (all of which God has subjected to the will) be sinful

if they observe that order which God has ordained for them? So then, whatever the members and senses do must be imputed entirely to the will.

Since the actions of the members and senses are imputed to the will, someone may wonder why the members and the senses are punished for the fault of the will. But in fact, only the will is punished and not the members and the senses. For nothing is punishment for anyone except that which is against his will (that is, whatever he does not want), and only a being who has a will can experience punishment. But the members and the senses will nothing through themselves. Thus, just as the will acts through the members and the senses, so it is also tormented or delighted through them. If anyone objects to this statement, then let him recall that it is really the soul (to which the will belongs) which feels and acts in those senses and members, and which is tormented or delighted in them. We are accustomed to say that the actions done by an unjust will are sins, because sin exists in the will which does them. Moreover, names such as 'fornication' or 'lying' are given to certain actions in order to signify that they are done unjustly. But an action (such as fornication or lying) is one thing, and the fact that it is done justly or unjustly is another. Therefore, no being is unjust in itself.

CHAPTER V

That the Evil Which Is Sin or Injustice Is Nothing

Like blindness, injustice is nothing at all. For blindness is nothing other than the absence of sight where sight ought to be; and the absence of sight is nothing more in an eye where sight ought to be than it is in a piece of wood where sight ought not to be. For injustice is not something which is able to infect and corrupt the soul in the same way that poison infects and corrupts the body, nor can it do something in the same way that a wicked man

does evil deeds. When a savage beast, having broken its bonds, rages about wildly, we say that this is caused by the absence of chains--not because this absence of chains is anything or causes something, but because chains would have kept the beast from raging. Or again, if a helmsman, having left the rudder, delivers his ship to the wind and the waves so that it is tossed and driven into some kind of danger, we say that the lack of a rudder causes this--not because this lack of a rudder is or causes anything, but because a rudder would have kept the ship from danger. So too, when an evil man rages and is driven into those evil deeds which are a danger to his soul, we say that injustice causes these actions--not because injustice has being or causes anything, but because justice would have kept them from happening. For when justice is absent from the will, to which all the voluntary motions of the whole man are subordinated, then the will is without a helmsman and is uncontrolled and tossed about. In such a state it is driven by various appetites until it precipitates itself and all the members subordinated to it into manifold evils. But if justice had been present in the will, it would have kept all this from happening.

Therefore, even though the affections and acts of an unjust will are usually called 'injustice,' and even though they are something when considered in themselves, we can see from the above examples that injustice itself has no being. And we understand evil to be nothing for the same reason. For as injustice is nothing other than the absence of a required justice, so evil is nothing other than the absence of a required good. No being, however evil, is called nothing; but for it to be evil is not for it to be something. For a being to be evil is simply for it to lack a good which it ought to have; and for it to lack a good which it ought to have is not for it to be something.

Therefore, for any being to be evil is not for it to be something.

I have been discussing that evil which is injustice and have shown that it is undoubtedly nothing at all. There is, of course, another kind of evil, namely the evil of disadvantage--for disadvantages are called evil. Sometimes these disadvantages are nothing (e.g., blindness and deafness), and sometimes they are something (e.g., grief and sadness). But I think I have sufficiently shown in The Fall of Satan that justice is uprightness of will kept for its own sake, that injustice has no being since it is only the absence of a required justice, that every being is from God, and that nothing comes from God except what is good. Moreover, I have discussed the notion of justice still more fully in the dialogue Concerning Truth.

CHAPTER VI

That Nevertheless When God Punishes a Man for Sin, He Does Not Punish Him for Nothing

There are certain people who, when they hear that sin is nothing, are accustomed to ask, 'If sin is nothing, then why does God punish a man for sin--for no one should be punished for nothing?' Although this is a small question, some kind of answer should be given to them because they do not really understand what they are asking.

Now although it is true that the absence of justice is nothing both where there ought to be justice and where it ought not to be, yet God rightly punishes sinners on account of something and not on account of nothing. For as I have shown in the Cur Deus Homo, God both exacts from recalcitrant sinners the honor due to Him which they were unwilling to repay freely, and He separates these sinners from just persons by an appropriate arrangement so that nothing disordered might exist in His kingdom. Thus God punishes for

something and not for nothing.] However, God does not punish brute creatures, in whom justice ought not to be, for their lack of justice (i.e., on account of nothing); for there is nothing that He should demand of them, nor is there anything which the harmonious order of the universe requires. Thus when God punishes a man for sin (which is the absence of justice and hence is nothing), He does not at all punish him on account of nothing. And since it is true that God does not punish a man unless there is something on account of which He should punish him, then it is false that God punishes a man for nothing.

CHAPTER VII

How the Seed of Man Is Said To Be Unclean and To Be Conceived in Sin,
Even Though There Is No Sin in It

I think the following things, which we have already discussed, are clear:

(1) that sin and injustice are nothing; (2) that they exist only in a rational will; and (3) that only the will can properly be called unjust. So it seems to follow either that at the very moment of his conception an infant has a rational soul (without which he cannot have a rational will), or else that at the moment of his conception he has no original sin. But no sensible person thinks that an infant has a rational soul at the very moment of his conception. For from such a view it would follow that whenever the human seed miscarried during the period between conception and the time it attained a human form /humanam figuram/, the human soul in that seed would be condemned, since it would not have been reconciled to God in Christ. But such a conclusion is utterly absurd. And so the supposition that an infant has a rational soul at the very moment of his conception must be given up.

But if the infant does not have sin at the moment of his conception, then why does Job say to God: 'Who can make a man clean from an unclean seed except

Thou alone?' (Job 14:4) And how is David's statement true when he says: 'I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me'? (Ps. 51:5) Thus, insofar as I am able I shall inquire how infants are said to be conceived in iniquity and sin, and to be conceived from unclean seed even though there is no sin in them at the moment of their conception.

Now Holy Scripture often asserts that something is already the case, not because it really is already the case, but because it is certain that it is going to happen. Thus, with respect to the forbidden tree, God said to Adam: 'In the day that you eat of it, you shall surely die.' (Gen. 2:17) But this did not mean that on that day Adam's body would actually die, but only that on that day it would become necessary for Adam to be going to die. And Paul also speaks concerning the necessity of dying someday: 'But if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is alive because of justification.' (Rom. 8:10) But this was not spoken to those whose bodies were already dead, but to those whose bodies were going to die on account of sin, since 'Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death.' (Rom. 5:12) Thus when Adam sinned, we all sinned in him--not because we sinned before we even existed, but because we were going to be born from Adam and because it was thus necessary that we would sin as soon as we existed. For 'through one man's disobedience, many men were made sinners.' (Rom. 5:19)

In the same way, man can be understood to be conceived in iniquity and sin, and from unclean seed--not because there is actually any iniquity, sin, or uncleanness in the seed itself, but because from that seed and its conception there occurs the necessity that man will have the uncleanness of sin (uncleanness is sin and iniquity) just as soon as he has a rational soul. For if an infant is begotten by means of a corrupt concupiscence, there is no more

guilt in the seed than there is in the spittle spat forth by means of the evil will of an angry man, or even in the shedding of his own blood. For what is at fault is not the spittle or the blood, but the evil will. So it is clear how it can be true that there is no sin in infants at the time of their conception and that Holy Scripture can appear to oppose this. For there can be no sin in infants at that moment since there is no will in them; nevertheless, sin can be said to be in them because they contract in the seed the necessity of sinning just as soon as they are human beings.

CHAPTER VIII

That There Is Neither Sin nor the Necessity of Future Sin in the Seed Assumed from the Virgin

Now if I am right, then the seed which is taken from the parent has no sin in it, because it does not yet have a will. So it is clear that what the Son of God assumed from the Virgin into His person could not have been blemished by sin. But we have said that the seed is contracted from parents with the necessity of sinning at that future time when it will have been enlivened with a rational soul. There are three reasons for this necessity of sinning. First, human nature is born in infants with the obligation to make satisfaction for the sins of Adam (and perhaps also in some respect for the sins of its recent ancestors). Yet human nature cannot make satisfaction, and as long as it does not, it sins. Second, human nature cannot recover by means of its own efforts the justice which it has deserted. And third, the soul is weighed down by a corrupted body and cannot even understand justice; but if the soul cannot understand justice, then it can neither have it nor keep it. Therefore, if it can be shown that the seed which the Son of God assumed from the Virgin is free from these three necessities, then it will be clear that

it contracted no necessity of sinning.

From a consideration of the personal unity of the one who is assuming a nature and the nature which is being assumed, it can easily be shown that the second and the third necessity are different from the seed itself. (By the second necessity I mean the necessity that human nature be unable by itself to recover justice. And by the third necessity I mean the necessity by which the corrupted body weighs down the soul, so that without the help of grace the soul is unable to keep the justice which is received at the perfect age i.e., when the rational will is given, and so that the soul of infants is unable even to understand what justice is.) Now, regarding the first necessity, with respect to which human nature is obliged to make satisfaction for the sins of both its first and ~~more~~ recent ancestors: if it can be shown that the seed which descends from Jesus' first parents is free from the obligation of making satisfaction for sin, then without a doubt no such obligation can descend to Him from His more recent ancestors. So with the help of God I shall try to show how the seed which descends from Jesus' first parents is free from the necessity of making satisfaction for sin; though since this has already been shown in other works, it is not necessary to discuss it here at great length.

CHAPTER IX

Why the Sin by Which the Human Race Is Condemned Is Imputed to Adam Rather Than to Eve, Even Though Adam Sinned After Eve and on Her Account

It seems to me that we should first ask why the sin by which the human race is condemned is more often and more particularly imputed to Adam than to Eve, although she sinned before Adam did, and he sinned because of her. For the Apostle says, 'But death reigned from Adam until Moses, even in those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression.' (Rom. 5:14) And there

are many other texts where Adam is seen to be more at fault than Eve.

I think perhaps Scripture speaks this way because a union of two things often takes its name from the chief member of the union, just as a whole sometimes takes its name from one of its parts. Or Scripture may speak this way because the name 'Adam' was applicable both to Adam and to his rib, which was able to be fashioned into a woman--just as we read that God 'created them male and female, and blessed them, and called their name "Adam" on the day in which they were created.' (Gen. 5:2) Or again, Scripture may speak this way because if only Eve had sinned, but not Adam, it would not have been necessary for the human race to perish, but only for Eve to perish. For God could have created another woman from Adam. For from Adam, in whom the seed of all mankind had been created, God could have made another woman through whom His purpose with respect to Adam might have been accomplished. For these same reasons, I shall refer to these two people by the one name 'Adam' --except in those places where it is necessary to distinguish between them.

CHAPTER X

Why Men Who Were Not Conscious of Adam's Sin Are Weighed Down by It

Each of us is a man and is a son of Adam by virtue of creation; and each of us is Adam by virtue of propagation; and each of us is a person by virtue of the individuation by which we are distinguished from one another. So we do not have our manhood from Adam, but through him. For just as Adam did not cause his own manhood, so he did not create in himself this human nature which can reproduce. Rather God, who created him a man, created in him that nature by which he might propagate other men. Therefore, we need have no doubt why each of us is under the obligation we have been discussing. We are not under this obligation because we are men or because we are persons: For if anyone

were guilty of this debt simply because he is a man or is a person, then it would have been necessary for Adam himself to have been under this obligation even before he sinned--since he was even then a man and a person. But such a consequence is completely absurd. So the remaining alternative is that man is a debtor only insofar as he is Adam. But he is not a debtor simply because he is Adam, but because he is Adam the Sinner. For if he were a debtor simply because he is Adam, then it would follow that even if Adam himself had not sinned, those who are propagated from him would still have been born with this debt. But such a thought is impious.

It is not out of place here to repeat the question which was asked above, namely why someone who was not conscious of Adam's sin should be nonetheless weighed down by Adam's sin and debt simply because of being propagated from him. When God created Adam He made in him a reproductive nature, and God subjected this nature to Adam's power, so that Adam might use it in accordance with his own will as long as that will was subordinate to God. But his reproductive nature was not meant to be used for irrational bestial pleasure, but rather in accordance with a rational human will. For just as it is characteristic of beasts to will nothing rationally, so it is proper to men to will nothing apart from reason. For men should always will in accordance with reason, because Adam could have always kept this power to will in accordance with reason which he received from God. When God created Adam directly, without the working of any reproductive nature and apart from the will of any creature, He made Adam rational and just. And God also gave Adam grace such that, if he had not sinned, those whom he would beget by his will and by the working of his animal nature would also be just in the moment they had rational souls.

The argument presented in the Cur Deus Homo to show that human nature

was created both rational and just also shows that, if Adam had not sinned, then those propagated from this human nature would necessarily have been not only rational, but also just. For God, who created the first man without the means of parental generation, also creates those who are propagated through the first man's created nature. So if Adam had not sinned, then every man would have been rational and just at the same time--even as he was. But since Adam was unwilling to be subject to the will of God, his reproductive nature (which remained in him) was no longer subject to his will as it would have been if he had not sinned. So he lost the grace which he could have kept for those who were going to be propagated from him; and all who are propagated by the working of the nature which Adam received are born under his obligation to make satisfaction. For human nature as a whole was in Adam, and no part of it was in anyone else; and by sinning without any necessity, human nature dishonored God and could not make any satisfaction to God by itself. Therefore, Adam lost that grace which he received and which he could always have kept on behalf of those who were going to be propagated from him; and for these descendants he also contracted sin and its accompanying penalty--insofar as sin and its penalty are propagated in his descendants through the reproductive nature which was given to him.

CHAPTER XI

That Propagation From the Virgin Is Not Subject to the Law and the Merits of Natural Propagation; and That There Are Three Courses of Things

Now we must carefully consider whether this so-called inheritance and penalty of sin is justly transmitted to the man who was propagated from Adam through the Virgin. But it is certain that the reproductive nature which Adam received works only through the conjunction of a man and a woman. So it is

impossible to suppose that human nature is such that a man alone or a woman alone--simply by the working of his own nature and will--could beget offspring. For just as the clay of the earth had not received a nature or will by which to produce the first man (although the clay was that from which the first man was able to be made by God), so also a woman was not made from the rib of Adam nor was a man made from a woman alone by the working of human nature and will. Rather, God, by His own power and will, made one man from clay, made another man from a woman alone, and made a woman from a man alone. For although nothing is done except by the efficient or permitting will of God, nevertheless certain things are done by His power and will alone, certain other things are done by the created nature, and still other things by the will of the creature. But just as created nature can do nothing of itself except what God permits, so the will of the creature cannot do anything by itself except what created nature assists in or concedes to. For in the beginning, the will of God alone made the natures of things, giving appropriate wills to various individuals, so that these natures and these wills might perform their work in the course of things in accordance with that order which God prescribed for them. Moreover, God creates many other things by means of the working of these natures and wills, when something is done by them which they could not at all have done in accordance with their appointed use and purpose.

For when the sea offers a dry path within itself to a people, or when the dead rise, or when water is suddenly changed into wine, or when the hearts of men are taught by the Holy Spirit certain things which they do not know either from themselves or from another creature, or when by the directing of grace alone evil wills are converted from their own impulses unto that which is beneficial, and when other things are done which neither the creature nor

its will might have done in its own natural way--these things are the work of God's will alone. Nature draws what is light upward and what is heavy downward. Nature makes the earth bring forth countless plants and trees, and makes these bear fruit--and sometimes she does this by first using a human will which plants and cultivates the earth, and other times she does this without any working of a human will. And we know more from experience than from what we are taught that nature does many other such works. But things such as making a road, building, writing, speaking, and the like are thought of as works belonging to the will rather than to nature; for the will alone causes such things as these.

Therefore, if we carefully consider all the things which are done, we see that they occur either by the will of God alone, or by nature according to the power given to it by God, or by the will of a creature. Now, those things which are not done by created nature or by the will of a creature, but done by God alone, are miracles. Thus it appears that there are three courses of things, viz., the miraculous, the natural, and the voluntary. And indeed the miraculous is not subject to the other two or to their laws, but it freely rules over them; nor does it do violence to them when it seems to oppose them, since they have nothing except what they received from the miraculous, and since the miraculous has established them completely under itself. Therefore, like the propagation which brought forth a woman from a man alone, and like the creation of a man from clay, the propagation of a man from a virgin alone is neither natural nor voluntary, but miraculous. For this reason, it is clear that the propagation from the Virgin is not at all subject to the laws and merits of that propagation which the will and nature collaborate in effecting. For in this collaboration, the will does one thing and nature does

another. Nevertheless, just as any man or woman who exists from the union of a man and a woman is truly man--so Adam, who existed from no other man, is truly man, and Jesus, who existed from a woman alone, is truly man, and Eve, who existed from a man alone, is truly man. Moreover, every man is either Adam or from Adam; but Eve is from Adam alone, and all others are from Adam and Eve. Now since Mary, from whom alone Jesus exists, is from Adam and Eve, it follows that He himself must be from the same pair. For it was expedient that He who was going to redeem the human race should exist and be born from the father and mother of all men.

CHAPTER XII

That There Is No Good Reason for Adam's Evils To Be Passed to That Man

It is also easy to understand why the Son of the Virgin could not be subject to the sin, or debt, of Adam. For Adam was created just: he was free from sin, its debt, and its penalty. And Adam was created happy and with the ability to keep forever the justice he had received; and through his keeping justice, he was able to keep the freedom and happiness I have just mentioned. Since he did not keep these goods for himself (although he was always able to do so without any difficulty), he removed them from himself and subjected himself to their opposite. And Adam was made the servant of sin, or injustice, and the servant of a debt which he was unable to repay, and the servant of that wretchedness which is characterized by the inability to recover the goods which he had lost. Just as he was unable to remove from himself the goods which he had (or to bring upon himself the evils which he did not have) in any other way than by not keeping those goods for himself when he could have, so he was only able to remove those goods from others (and only able to bring those evils upon others) by not keeping those goods for the persons for whom he was able

to keep them. But Adam was able to keep those goods for no one except for those persons whose possibility of generation had been made subject to his will. Hence, Adam could not transmit the aforementioned evils to any person (even though propagated from him) unless either Adam's reproductive nature or Adam's will worked or was able to work something in the generation of that person. Therefore, by no right or reason can it be shown that these evils passed from Adam to the man conceived by the Virgin.

CHAPTER XIII

That Even If Jesus Had Not Been God, but Only and Entirely a Man,
It Would Nevertheless Have Been Necessary for Him To Be As
the First Man Was Created To Be

Or again, if we carefully examine the wise justice of God with the pure gaze of reason, then we recognize that it is completely absurd and unnecessary that Adam's sin, or debt, or penalty should be transmitted to Jesus. And this would be the case even if Jesus had not been assumed into the person of God, but had been only and entirely a man. For it is absurd that Adam's sin, debt, and penalty should be passed down through a seed which is produced solely by the will of God--a seed which is not produced or brought forth by any created nature, or by the will of any creature, or by a power given by God to anyone else; for in order to beget a man by means of a new power, God takes from the Virgin this seed which is free from sin. In this case, a rational mind understands that for the same reason that God ought to create Adam fully just and unburdened by any debt or disadvantage, so God ought to create Jesus (who is begotten by His own will and power) free from subjection to any evil. For it does not befit God's omnipotent and wise goodness that this man's rational nature should be formed by God's will from matter in which there is any sin. Whoever does not understand this

fact does not know what is unfitting with respect to God. Therefore, even if God had made Jesus to be only a man (as I said above), it would still have been necessary for God to have endowed Him with no less justice and happiness than Adam possessed when he was first created.

CHAPTER XIV

That What Is Written--'That Man Is Conceived from Unclean Seed
And in Iniquity'--Does Not Oppose the Proposed Argument

Perhaps someone may not understand the things which I have said regarding the seed of man, namely that there is no sin in it before it becomes a rational soul, and that this seed is called unclean in sin and iniquity on account of a later uncleanness which will be in man. And perhaps someone may think that the seed is unclean in the moment of its conception because he reads the two verses which I have already opposed to my own argument, namely 'Who can make a man clean from an unclean seed?' and 'I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.' (Job 14:4, Ps. 51:5)

If there is any such person, there is no need for me to strive here to make him understand what he cannot understand; but I ask him now to listen closely to a few things which I am going to say.

Those who have had recourse to these scripture verses either want them to be understood as referring to the seed of every man or else as referring only to that seed which is inseminated with the sense of pleasure which would have been proper only to brute animals, had man not sinned. But if they understand this text to refer to all men, then they would have to assert that the seed of Jesus Himself--even though it was taken from the Virgin--was unclean. But it is blasphemous to believe this. Therefore, these scripture verses do not refer to all men; and if they refer to any seed of man, then it

must be to that seed which is inseminated with a sense of pleasure. Moreover, this conclusion is not opposed to our own argument which asserts that the seed taken from the Virgin is clean even though it be from the sinful mass.

CHAPTER XV

How the Sinful Mass Is Not Totally Sinful

For blindness is not in every part of a man when he is called 'blind' (for it is only in his eyes, where there ought to be sight, and not in his hands or in his feet). In the same way, the deafness of a man who is called 'deaf' is only in his ears. Similarly, although the mass of the human race is called 'sinful,' sin is not in every part, but only in the will, which does not exist in the seed at the time of the conception of any man. Therefore, if we consider these things, we see that neither true nor apparent reasons contradict them. So we can now freely conclude that there is no reason, no truth, or no understanding which allows us to assert that anything pertaining to the sin of the sinful mass could or should have affected that man who was conceived from the Virgin alone. And this conclusion is true, even though He was assumed from that sinful mass; and it would still be true even if He had not been God.

CHAPTER XVI

Why John the Baptist and Others Who Were Also Conceived by Miracle Are Not As Such Free from Sin

But someone may object that John the Baptist and certain other men were begotten from sterile parents and from parents in whom the reproductive nature was already dead because of old age; and they may pursue our line of argument and say that these men also ought to have been born without sin and its penalty because they too were conceived by a miracle. But such people should understand that there is a different reason which shows that the virgin conception is necessarily free from all sin. For it is one thing for God to heal a

nature which is enfeebled by old age or some defect and to recall it to its proper working; but it is another thing for God to cause something to occur in nature which is not only unknown and unheard of, but even unimaginable. For if Adam had not sinned, then not only would he have remained unweakened by old age or any other infirmity, but also that nature created in him for the sake of reproduction would not have been impeded from its natural course by his fall; and it would have remained subject to his power and to his use. Therefore, although in the case of the Son of the Virgin something new was given with respect to Adamic nature, nothing new was given in the case of John and others like him; but we see that their nature, which was weakened as a result of its own work, is simply restored. Therefore, since all these men were begotten by means of that natural propagation which was given to Adam, they neither can nor ought to be likened unto Jesus, whose miraculous conception we have been discussing; hence, they cannot be shown to be free from the bond of original sin.

CHAPTER XVII

Why God Was Incarnated Even Though He Was Able To Make Without Sin
as Many Men as Were Necessary To Complete the Heavenly City

Now perhaps someone will say: 'If, as you say, someone who was purely man (and not God) could be made from Adam without any taint of sin, then why was it necessary for God to be incarnated? For either God was able to redeem sinners through one man who was without any sin, or else by means of a similar kind of miracle God was able to make as many men as were necessary to complete the heavenly city.'

I shall briefly reply to this. First God was made man because a man who was not God /homo non-deus/ would not have been sufficient for the redemption

of other men--as I pointed out in the Cur Deus Homo. And second, God did not, by means of a miracle, make as many men as were necessary to fill up the heavenly city lest (if none of those who were propagated by natural means were saved) it should seem that He had created Adamic nature in vain and later corrected it, as if He had not made it properly in the first place. But it is not fitting for Supreme Wisdom first to make and later to correct any nature.

Now you remember that I proposed above to inquire how that seed, which was taken from the Virgin and in which we have seen that there was no sin, could be free from those three necessities in which all men are conceived. I was confident that if it could first be shown rationally that this seed was free from the necessity of making satisfaction for the sin of Adam and of recent ancestors, then--because Jesus is God-Man--His seed could also be free from the other two necessities; viz., from that necessity by which human nature is unable by itself to recover the justice it has deserted and from that necessity by which 'the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul' (especially the souls of infants). I began by asking how we should understand the necessity of making satisfaction for Adam's sin. I did this so that afterwards it would be easier to find what I sought with respect to the other two necessities. And by the abundant grace of that one whose sinless conception we are discussing, our inquiry was accomplished, so that we saw the seed of Jesus to be free from all the aforesaid necessities of sin and debt, and so that it was also rationally proven that a man thus conceived ought to be endowed with no less justice and happiness than Adam was when he was first created. And this should be the case even if a man thus conceived were not God, but were only and entirely man. For indeed it seemed irrational both that (1) sin or the penalty of sin should descend from any ancestors to one born by means of such a propa-

gation, and (2) that God should freely create an unjust rational nature or that He should make a rational nature wretched when there is no injustice in it which merits wretchedness.

CHAPTER XVIII

That God Was Not Conceived from a Just Virgin by Necessity--as
If He Could Not Have Been Conceived from a Sinful Virgin --
But He Was Conceived in This Way Because It Was Fitting

Although the Son of God was really conceived from the sinless Virgin, nevertheless it was not done by necessity--as if just offspring could not be begotten from a sinful virgin. But it was done because it was fitting that this man should be conceived from a sinless mother. For since God the Father was disposed to give the Virgin His only Son (whom from His own heart He begot as equal to Himself and loved as much as Himself) so that He would naturally be the common son of God the Father and the Virgin, and since the Son Himself chose to make her substantially His mother, and since the Holy Spirit willed and was going to cause the Son from whom He proceeded to be conceived and born from her, then it was fitting that the Virgin should be radiant with the greatest purity a creature can have. And I have already discussed [in the Cur Deus Homo] how the Virgin was made sinless by means of faith before that conception; however, in that writing I presented another argument concerning this point.

CHAPTER XIX

How This Argument and the One in the Cur Deus
Homo Are Alike, and How They Are Different

Either of these two arguments seems to be sufficient in itself to handle this one question; but jointly they fully satisfy a mind which is seeking both an argument which is sound and an event which is fitting. For although the

argument there and the one here move toward the same conclusion, they differ in the following respect: The one I have given in this treatise shows that, by means of a virgin conception, God should produce a just man (and only a just man) from the substance of the Virgin even if she were sinful--for sin is nowhere in the nature of man except in the will. And the other argument shows that even if sin pervaded the essence of the Virgin, nevertheless by means of faith the Virgin was able to become free from sin (in regard to the sinlessness of such a conception). And in the argument I have presented in this treatise all necessity of death, travail, and corruption of every kind is clearly excluded from the man born of the Virgin; but in the Cur Deus Homo a question concerning His necessity of dying seems to arise--though if someone closely examines the argument there, he will see that it is sufficient to handle this question. And so from these two arguments we see clearly that it was only because of His holy will/and not because of any necessity/ that Our Lord and Redeemer underwent all the things which He suffered.

CHAPTER XX

That He Who Was Born of the Virgin Had Original Justice in Place of Original Sin

Now I think that I have adequately shown what I set out to prove concerning original sin, namely how it could not be transmitted from His ancestors to the man conceived from the Virgin. And I have shown that reason requires that He ought rather to be created happy and just. Since that just man was born from a just Father with respect to His divine nature and from a just mother with respect to His human nature (as we say), it is fitting to maintain that He had an original justice in the place of that original injustice which all other sons of Adam have at their origin.

CHAPTER XXI

Why He Was Unable To Have Personal Injustice

Moreover, it is superfluous to dispute about personal injustice in this case because it does not apply to Him, since there was never any human nature in Him without there also being divine nature in Him, and since bodily corruption did not burden His soul against His will nor hinder His soul in any way. His soul, as God, always existed as one person (in fact, man as a whole and the Word of God existed together as one person). Hence, in accordance with His person as God, He always had perfect justice, wisdom, and power from Himself--even though His human nature received all that it had from His divine nature.

I do not deny that there may be a better reason for explaining how God took from the sinful mass a man who had no sin, as if taking something unleavened from something leavened. And if there is a better argument than the one I have given here and in the Cur Deus Homo, then if it is shown to me I will gladly accept it. And I will not persist in my arguments if they can be shown to be false (though I doubt that they can be).

CHAPTER XXII

The Magnitude of Original Sin

Now, original sin can be neither something more nor something less than I have said, because as soon as an infant becomes rational, the human nature in that infant does not have the justice which it received and which it should always possess, nor does any inability ever excuse it for not having justice. Nevertheless, I do not think that original sin is as grave as I suggested earlier in this treatise. Because I wanted to show that original sin did not pertain to the man who was conceived from the Virgin, I stipulated that it was

so grave that nothing more could be added to it; and, as I said, I did this so as not to seem to minimize its gravity with respect to the topic at hand. But I shall now speak briefly about what I judge to be its real gravity.

I do not think that the sin of Adam is passed down in infants in such a way that they ought to be punished for it, i.e., as if each of them individually committed a personal sin just as Adam did. And I think this even though it has happened, on account of Adam's sin, that no one can be born without sin, which is followed by condemnation. For when the Apostle says that 'death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over those who had not sinned according to the likeness of Adam's transgression' (Rom. 5:14), he seems clearly to signify that neither the transgression of Adam, nor anything else equally great, is imputed to his descendants personally--even though the Apostle declares elsewhere in his writings that all the sons of Adam (with the exception of the Son of the Virgin) are 'sinners' and 'children of wrath.' (Rom. 5:8, Eph. 2:3) For when he says, 'even over those who had not sinned according to the likeness of Adam's transgression,' we can understand this to mean 'even over those who did not sin as much as Adam sinned when he transgressed.' And when the Apostle says, 'The law entered in so that the offence might abound,' he means one of two things: Either (1) before the law entered in, the sin in those 'who did not sin according to the likeness of Adam's transgression' was less than Adam's sin, or (2) after the law entered in, sin abounded in men more than it did in Adam. But when I think about it, I do not see how the latter alternative could be true. For in the Cur Deus Homo you have already read my views concerning the weightiness of Adam's sin and its satisfaction. Nevertheless, unless there is a satisfaction for the sin through which human nature precipitated itself into evil, no one can be restored to that state for which man was created and for

which a reproductive nature was given to him, and human nature cannot be rescued from those evils into which it fell.

Now someone will ask, 'If individuals do not have the sin of Adam, why do you maintain that no one is saved without there being a satisfaction for Adam's sin? For how can a just God demand satisfaction from them for a sin which they do not have?' But as I said in the Cur Deus Homo, God does not demand more than He ought to from any sinner; and since no sinner can repay as much as he owes, Christ alone made payment for those who are saved, repaying even more than they owe.

At this point we ought also to consider another reason why the sin in infants is less than the sin in Adam, even though sin is transmitted from him unto all men. For through one man, i.e., through Adam, 'sin entered into the world, and through sin death.' (Rom. 5:12)

CHAPTER XXIII

Why and How Adam's Sin Was Transmitted to Infants

Unless we understand why and how the sin of Adam is present in infants, then we shall not know why it is less in them than in Adam. Although we were previously discussing this question insofar as it was necessary for the problem then at hand, nevertheless it will not be superfluous to repeat certain things briefly. Now, it cannot be denied that infants existed in Adam when he sinned. But they existed in Adam causally (or materially) as if in his seed; and they exist in themselves personally. For in Adam they were his very seed, while in themselves they are individual and different persons. Insofar as they existed in Adam, they were not different from Adam; but insofar as they exist in themselves, they are different from him. In Adam they were Adam, but in themselves they are themselves. Therefore, all infants existed in Adam, but they did not

exist in Adam as themselves--since they did not yet exist as themselves
[i.e., exist personally].

Perhaps someone will say, 'That existence in terms of which other men are said to have existed in Adam is so empty as to be nothing, and should not even be called "existence."' But then he should also say that the existence whereby Christ existed in Abraham and in David and in the other forefathers as their seed was also nothing or empty or false. And he should also term 'nothing' the existence whereby all those things that come from seeds were first in seeds; and he should also assert that God created nothing when He created the seminal existence of all those things which are later procreated from seeds. But such a seminal existence is not nothing; for if it were nothing then those things which exist from seeds would also be nothing. For unless those things which nature produces from seeds were first something in those seeds themselves, then such things could not exist from seeds in any way at all. Therefore, if it is not foolish to think that the things which nature produces from seeds are something in those seeds before being produced from them, then the existence by which all men were in Adam is not false or empty, but is true and solid existence. So too, God did not create an empty something when He created all men to exist in Adam in this way. But as I said above, in him they were not different from him, and they were not yet what they were later to be in themselves.

Now although it is true that all men were in Adam, nevertheless the Son of the Virgin was in Adam in a way vastly different from other men. For all others were in Adam in such a way that they existed from him through that reproductive nature which was subject to his power and his will, but Jesus alone was not in Adam in such a way that He existed from him through his reproductive

nature or his will. Hence at the time that Adam sinned, it had been established that he was the one from whom all other men were going to exist--and going to exist by way of propagation. But though it had been established that Adam was the one from whom Jesus was going to exist, yet Jesus was not going to exist from him by way of propagation--because it was not in Adam's power that Jesus should be propagated from him. And it was also not in Adam's power to make Jesus either from another being or from nothing. Hence, it did not lie within the power of Adam that Jesus should exist in any way. For it was neither in the power of his nature nor in the power of his will to cause Jesus to exist in any way whatsoever. Nevertheless, there did exist in Adam that nature from which Jesus was going to be propagated by the power of God (and not by the power of Adam). For even though the human will inseminated, and nature brought forth, offspring in the lineage from Adam to the Virgin Mother, so that the Virgin received her own existence from Adam in the same way that we all do (viz., partly by the natural order and partly by the voluntary order), nevertheless in the Virgin neither nature nor the will of the creature produced offspring; but rather 'the Holy Spirit and the Power of the Most High' (Luke 1:35) miraculously begat a man from the Virgin Mother. Therefore, it was in Adam--that is, in his power of propagation--that all men (except Jesus) should exist from him. But it was not in Adam's power to cause Jesus to exist from him at all--just as it was not in the power of the clay from which the first man was created to cause Adam to exist from it by means of a miracle. Nor was it in Adam's power to cause Eve to exist from him in the miraculous way that she did. So too, although Jesus existed in the lineage of persons from Adam to Mary, it was not in the power of any of these persons to cause Him to exist. Nevertheless, Jesus existed in them; for just as the first man existed in the

clay from which he was created, and just as Eve existed in Adam from whom she was created--though neither of them was created by the will or power of the creature, but solely by the power of God--so too, because Jesus existed in those from whom He was to be assumed, He existed in His ancestors. And to the extent that being made God-Man is greater than being made pure man, to that same extent is the grace and miracle of Jesus's begottenness greater than that of Adam and Eve's. Hence, at the time Adam sinned, Jesus was in Adam in a quite different way from those who are begotten from Adam through the natural and voluntary orders. There is, then, a certain sense in which Adam does make other men whenever the human will and human nature procreate them through a power which the will and nature have received from God. But God alone made Jesus. For even though Jesus is from Adam, He is not through Adam but through Himself and even, as it were, from Himself.

Therefore, what is more suitable for showing the magnitude of God's goodness and the plentitude of grace granted to Adam than that Adam had the power to cause other men who existed through him to be what he was by nature. By the great goodness of God, Adam was given the freedom of choice by which to propagate men who would have the same quality of justice and happiness in their wills that he had in his. But even though Adam was established in such lofty grace, he nonetheless freely deserted the goods which were given him and which were to be kept for himself and for his posterity. For this reason, his descendants lost the goods which Adam their father could have given them--had he kept these goods rather than cast them away. To understand this fully, we must carefully consider pure justice, giving no heed to our prejudices (which often hinder the mind from understanding uprightness). And if we do this, then it seems to me that what I have said above constitutes a sufficient

reason for the sin and evils of Adam to descend to infants. Nonetheless, I shall say a bit more about my views concerning the way that Adam's sin is transmitted to his descendants.

Earlier, I said that there is a sin which comes from a person and a sin which comes from a nature. The sin which comes from a person can be called 'personal' sin, and the sin which comes from a nature can be called 'natural,' or 'original,' sin. Now, just as what is personal passes over into what is natural, so what is natural passes over into what is personal. For example, nature required that Adam eat something, because it was nature's ordained role to make such a requirement. But when Adam ate the fruit of the forbidden tree, it was not a natural will, but his own personal will that did this. Nevertheless although the person did this thing, he did not do it apart from his nature. For the first man was a person insofar as he was called 'Adam'; and he was a nature insofar as he was called 'man.' The person, therefore, made the nature sinful, because when Adam sinned man sinned. Nevertheless, it was not because he was man that he was impelled to partake of what was forbidden; rather, he was drawn to this by his own desire and will--which originated in his person and not in his nature. But this order of nature and person is reversed in the infants who are conceived from Adam. For the fact that the justice which they should have is not in them is not the fault of a personal will (as it was in Adam's case), but results because the nature which they receive from Adam lacks this justice. For human nature--which did not exist outside of Adam at the time he sinned--was stripped of the justice which it possessed; and it forever after lacks justice unless it is aided by God. Hence, because human nature subsists in persons and because persons do not exist without natures, human nature causes the persons of infants to be sinful. So in Adam the person deprived human nature of

the good of justice; and human nature, thus impoverished, causes all those persons whom it procreates from itself to be sinful and unjust because of the same need of justice. In this way, the personal sin of Adam is found in all those who are propagated from him, even though in them it is not personal sin, but natural (or original) sin.

So it is clear that there is a great difference between the magnitude of Adam's sin and that of those who are propagated from him. Because Adam sinned by his own will, his progeny sin by that necessity of nature which the personal will of Adam merited for its sin. And although no one thinks that unequal sins are followed by equal penalties, nevertheless the condemnation for personal and original sin is identical, inasmuch as no one who has sinned in either way will be admitted into the Kingdom of God (for which end man was made) except by means of the death of Christ, which alone remits the debt incurred by the sin of Adam. For even though not all men deserve equal torment in Hell, they all do deserve (apart from the death of Christ) to be excluded from the Kingdom of God⁷. Hence, after the day of judgment every angel and every man will be either in the Kingdom of God or in Hell. So we see that the sin of infants is less than the sin of Adam, and that nevertheless no one is saved in any way other than by means of that universal satisfaction through which every sin--both great and small--is remitted. And I have already discussed in the Cur Deus Homo why this satisfaction could not happen except through the death of Christ; and by the help of God, I also tried there to understand how salvation comes to man through Christ's death.

CHAPTER XXIV

That the Sins of Our Ancestors Who Lived After Adam Are Not
Reckoned in the Original Sin of Their Descendants

I do not think that the sins of our recent ancestors are a part of original sin. Indeed, had Adam not been able to transmit his own justice to those who were going to be generated from him, then he would also not have been able to transmit his own injustice to them. By the same kind of reasoning, since no one who lives after Adam is able to keep justice for his own offspring [for such a person has received from Adam no justice to transmit], I see no reason why the sins of recent ancestors should be imputed to the souls of their children. For there is no doubt that infants do not keep uprightness of will for its own sake; and so they are all equally unjust because they do not have that justice which every human being ought to have. This utter lack of justice is transmitted to all human beings from Adam, in whom ~~human~~ nature deprived itself of this same justice. Moreover, although some justice remained in Adam--so that he could keep an upright will in some things--nevertheless human nature was deprived of that gift by which it could have kept justice for itself in Adam's posterity. As a result, human nature was not able to propagate itself as a just nature in any of Adam's offspring. And all that human nature could remove from itself in infants was justice, together with the happiness which is given only to those who possess the required justice.

Thus, it does not seem possible that the injustice of our recent ancestors could increase the deprivation of justice in human nature such that a greater deprivation could descend to infants from the sin of Adam. For where there is already no justice, no justice can be taken away. And where no justice can be removed, no injustice can be added. Therefore, unjust ancestors are able to add no other injustice to their children than this deprivation of justice which we are discussing [viz., that which comes from Adam]. But

justice can always be given where none now exists. So if unjust ancestors are said to add any injustice to their children, then it seems both possible and rather probable that just ancestors can give justice to their descendants. But if this happens, the infant descendants of just ancestors have some kind of justice; and then these infants--if they die without baptism--would be condemned less severely than the children of unjust ancestors. Or if the children of just ancestors were saved, then they would be saved by virtue of having some antecedent merit. But the Apostle Paul denies such a thing when, by referring to Jacob and Esau, he proves that no infant is saved except by a grace which is antecedent to the merits of all infants alike. Therefore, since just ancestors do not give justice to their own descendants prior to baptism, unjust ancestors do not add injustice to their descendants.

But someone may say: "It is true that unjust ancestors do not add any injustice to their descendants, inasmuch as they are unable to remove any justice from them. But they do cause that original injustice which their descendants have from Adam to affect them more seriously. Conversely, just ancestors cause the original injustice which their descendants have from Adam to affect them less seriously. For this reason, if children of just ancestors are less unjust than children of unjust ancestors, then they ought not to be blamed as much as the children of unjust ancestors." But let that person dare to say this only if he can prove it. I, for one, do not dare to say this when I see that both the children of the just and of the unjust are variously elected to, or reprobated from, the grace of baptism. And if anyone else dares to propose the above argument, he cannot prove it. For certainly a man only becomes more just the more willing he is to seek or to avoid what he ought; in the same way, a man only becomes more unjust the more he loves or

despises what he ought not. But if it cannot be shown that, as soon as infants have a soul, some will more and others will less what they ought or ought not, then no one can prove that some children are begotten more or less just than others. But as the justice of just ancestors does not seem to mitigate the original injustice of their children, so the injustice of unjust ancestors does not seem to aggravate the original injustice of theirs. So if unjust ancestors are unable to increase the original sin of their children (either in number of sins or in their magnitude), then it seems to me that the sins of their ancestors since Adam are not included in the original sin of infants.

I do not deny that many goods and great benefits abound to the souls and to the bodies of offspring on account of the merits of their ancestors. Nor do I deny that children and grandchildren 'unto the third and fourth generation' (and perhaps even longer) are scourged with various tribulations in this life on account of the sins of their ancestors. And although it would take too long to introduce examples, I do not even deny that children lose goods of the soul which might have accrued to them had their parents been just. But I do maintain that original sin is present to the same extent in all infants who are conceived naturally--just as the sin of Adam, which is the cause of infants' being conceived in sin, pertains to all men equally.

CHAPTER XXV

How the Sins of Ancestors Harm the Souls of their Descendants

But if the sins of ancestors ever harm the souls of their descendants, then I think it might occur in this manner: God does not impute the sins of their ancestors to them, nor does He lead them into any transgression on account of their ancestors; but God does sometimes abandon men to their own sins on account of the sins of their unjust ancestors (just as He often rescues

men from sin on account of the merits of their just ancestors). For since no one is free from sin unless God sets him free, then when God does not set someone free from sin, we say that God leads him into sin; and when God does not soften a man's heart, we say that God hardens his heart. So if it is said that God punishes the sinful soul on account of the sins of unjust ancestors, then it seems more credible to think that God does this by abandoning the sinful soul (to which He owes nothing but punishment) to its own sins than to think that God does this by burdening the sinful soul with the sins of other men--tormenting it because of other men's sins rather than because of its own. So, therefore, without contradicting the fact that God visits the sins of parents upon their children (and even upon their children's souls) 'unto the third and fourth generation,' and without contradicting anything else we read in Scripture which seems to signify that the sins of parents harm the souls of their children, we can affirm that original sin is of the same magnitude in all men, and also that 'the son will not bear the iniquity of his father' (Ez. 18:20), and that 'each one shall bear his own burden' (Gal. 6:5), and that 'everyone will receive good or evil in accordance with what he has done in the body.' (II Cor. 5:10) For indeed, the soul of the son does not die on account of the sin of his father, but only because of its own iniquity; and the child does not bear another's burden, but only his own; and the son does not receive good and evil in the body in accordance with his father's deeds, but only in accordance with his own. However, on account of the sins of his unjust ancestors, the son has not been freed from his own evil deeds; and for this reason the iniquities which he bears are imputed [by Scripture] to the sins of his ancestors.

CHAPTER XXVI

How, Nevertheless, No One Bears the Sin of
His Ancestors, but Only His Own Sin

But perhaps someone may object that because all those who are not saved by faith in Christ bear the burden of Adam's iniquity, it follows that either (a) infants also ought to bear the iniquity of their other ancestors as well, or else (b) they ought not bear the iniquity of Adam. Now let anyone who makes this objection carefully consider the fact that infants do not bear Adam's iniquity, but bear their own. For Adam's sin is something different from the sin of infants--inasmuch as Adam's sin is a cause, and infants' sins an effect. Adam was deprived of required justice because he himself, and not another, deserted it; but infants are deprived of justice because someone else, and not themselves, deserted it. Therefore, the sin of Adam and the sin of infants are not the same thing. And when the Apostle says (as I mentioned earlier) that 'death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over those who had not sinned according to the likeness of Adam's transgression' (Rom. 5:14), then just as he indicates that the sin of infants is less than the sin of Adam, so also he clearly shows that their sin is something different from Adam's.

So then, when an infant is condemned on account of original sin, he is not condemned for Adam's sin but for his own; for if he did not have sin of his own, he would not be condemned. Hence, an infant bears his own iniquity and not Adam's, even though Scripture says that he bears the iniquity of Adam because Adam's sin was the cause of his own sin. But the power which Adam had to cause his descendants to be born in sin does not belong to any of our other ancestors, because human nature in these ancestors has no power to beget offspring who are just and unless it is possible for human nature to bestow justice upon its offspring, it is not possible for it to remove justice from

them⁷. Therefore, although there is sin in infants as a result of Adam's sin, there is no additional sin in them as a result of the iniquities of their other ancestors.

CHAPTER XXVII

What Original Sin Is, and That It Is of Equal Magnitude in All Human Beings

Therefore, I think that original sin is only that sin which is in an infant at the moment he has a rational soul. And I think this, regardless of any corruption that was in his body, or its members, before it received a soul, and regardless of anything that might happen to either his body or to his soul after the moment in which the body receives a soul. And I have presented arguments to explain why original sin is of equal magnitude in all infants who are propagated in accordance with the natural order, and why all who die in this sin alone are equally condemned. Whatever sin accrues to a man above and beyond original sin is personal sin; for as a human person is born sinful because of his nature, so human nature can be made more sinful because of the person--for when any human person sins, he sins as a man.

I am unable to understand original sin in infants as anything other than the loss of required justice which occurred through the disobedience of Adam. Through Adam's disobedience we are all children of wrath, since the voluntary desertion of justice accuses the human nature which acted in Adam, and the inability to recover justice in no way excuses the persons who are made having Adam's nature. The utter lack of happiness also accompanies the desertion of justice, so that all human persons are born lacking not only justice, but also happiness. In the exile of this life, these two deprivations leave all men defenseless and exposed to sins and miseries which constantly befall them, attacking them on every side (except insofar as they are protected by divine providence).

CHAPTER XXVIII

Against Those Who Do Not Think That Infants Should Be Condemned

There are those who do not wish to accept the view that infants who die without having been baptized should be condemned solely on the basis of the injustice which I have been discussing. Their reasoning is that no one judges infants to be blameworthy for the sin of another person, and infants are not just and rational as long as they remain infants; nor should God judge these innocent babes more severely than men judge them. But it must be replied to men of this opinion that God should act differently with respect to infants from the way ~~man~~ man should act. For man should not demand from human nature what he himself has not given to human nature and what is not owed to him by human nature. A man does not justly blame someone else for being born with guilt when such a person cannot be born without guilt and when he can only be cleansed from guilt by another. But God rightly demands from human nature what He has given to it, and what human nature justly owes to Him.

But if we think about it, God's judgment in condemning infants is not much different from the judgment of men. For suppose that some man and his wife, who have been elevated to great dignity and wealth through grace alone and not by their own merit, were both to commit a serious and unpardonable crime, so that they were justly cast down from their position and given into servitude. In this case, who shall say that the children born to them after their condemnation should not also be subjected to servitude, but ought rather to be restored to the goods which their parents freely and justly lost? But this is the situation of our first parents, who through their own fault were justly condemned from happiness into wretchedness, and so begat their children into the same exile. Now, although we ought to judge like cases by like standards, to the degree that the transgression of our first parents exceeds that

of the man and wife mentioned above, to that same degree ought our first parents to be judged more severely.

Finally, every man is either saved or condemned. Every man who is saved is admitted into the Kingdom of Heaven, and every man who is condemned is excluded from it. He who is admitted is elevated to the likeness of those angels in whom there never was or will be any sin; but this elevation cannot occur as long as there is any taint of sin in him. So it is impossible for a man to be saved if he has any sin, however small. Therefore, if what I have called 'original sin' is any sin at all, then it is necessary for every man who is born in original sin to be condemned for it--unless it has been removed from him.

CHAPTER XXIX

How the Inability To Have Justice Excuses Infants after Baptism

I have said that the inability to have justice does not excuse the injustice of infants. But perhaps someone will ask: 'If there is sin (i.e., injustice) in infants before they are baptized, and if you say that the inability to have justice is inexcusable, and if Christian baptism removes only the sin that precedes baptism, then since an infant is without justice for as long as he is an infant in the period following his baptism (for if justice is "uprightness of will kept for its own sake," an infant cannot even understand the justice which he should keep), why isn't an infant unjust even after he is baptized? If a baptized person dies in infancy before he knows how to repent (though not dying immediately after baptism), then since he does not have the required justice and since his inability to have it is no excuse, he is in an unjust state when he dies and so is not admitted into the Kingdom of God--since no unjust person enters therein. But the Catholic Church does not

believe that baptized infants who die before they know how to repent are excluded from the Kingdom of God. On the other hand, if baptism removes the future sin of infancy, then why doesn't it also remove those future sins which a person will commit later in his life?'

I reply that baptism completely blots out all the sins which existed before baptism. For this reason, the original inability to have justice which was imputed as sin to infants before they were baptized is not imputed to them afterwards. The inability to have justice could not excuse the absence of justice before baptism, since this inability is culpable; but even though this inability remains after baptism, it excuses the absence of justice because it is no longer culpable. Whence it follows that justice, which infants owed before they were baptized and for which they could offer no excuse, is not required of them as a kind of obligation after they are baptized. For as long as their only reason for not having justice is their original [i.e., natural] inability to have it, they are not unjust, since there is no lack of required justice in them. For one cannot be liable for something which exists in him without culpability. Therefore, if baptized infants die before they know how to repent, they are not unjust; rather they are saved as if they were just--saved both by means of the justice of Christ, who gave Himself for them, and by means of the justice of faith on the part of the Church, their Mother, who believes on their behalf.

More out of conjecture than out of certainty, I have discussed original sin to the best of my ability, and I shall hold my present views until God makes known to me some better understanding. But if someone else has a different interpretation, I shall not reject his opinion--or anyone else's--provided it can be proven to be true.

ON THE HARMONY OF THE FOREKNOWLEDGE, THE PREDESTINATION,
AND THE GRACE OF GOD WITH FREE CHOICE

(De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis
et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio)

ON THE HARMONY OF THE FOREKNOWLEDGE, THE PREDESTINATION, AND THE GRACE OF GOD WITH FREE CHOICE

With the help of God as I write, I shall try to set forth what He deigns to reveal to me concerning the three questions in which free choice seems to be incompatible with the foreknowledge, the predestination, and the grace of God.

Question One: Concerning Foreknowledge and Free Choice

CHAPTER I

The foreknowledge of God seems to be incompatible with free choice; for the things foreknown by God will necessarily occur, whereas things which happen through free choice take place out of no necessity. But if these are incompatible, then it is impossible that there should be foreknowledge of God, which foresees everything, and that there should also be an event which is brought about through freedom of choice. If, on the other hand, one perceives that there is no such impossibility, then the incompatibility which seems to hold is completely eliminated.

Therefore, let us posit both the foreknowledge of God, from which the necessity of future things seems to follow, and also freedom of choice, by which many things are believed to occur without any necessity; and let us see whether it is impossible for the two to coexist. If it is impossible, then there will arise a further impossibility. For if it really is impossible, then from our positing of free choice and divine foreknowledge, a contradiction will follow. Assuming, then, that there is some event which is going to happen without necessity, God foreknows it, for He foreknows every future event. But what God foreknows will necessarily occur in the same manner as He foreknows it to occur. It follows, then, that it is necessary for this event to be going to occur without necessity. Therefore, it is true that what

God foreknows will necessarily occur, but also true that God foreknows an event which will occur without any necessity. Consequently, to one who understands correctly, the foreknowledge from which necessity follows does not seem at all incompatible with freedom of choice, from which necessity is excluded.

But you will say to me: 'Your reasoning does not do away with the necessity of my sinning or of my not sinning, because God foreknows whether I am going to sin or not sin; and therefore, if I sin, it is necessary for me to sin, and if I do not sin, it is necessary that I do not sin.' To this I reply: You ought not to say merely 'God foreknows that I am going to sin' or 'God foreknows that I am not going to sin.' But you should say 'God foreknows that it is without necessity that I am going to sin' or 'God foreknows that it is without necessity that I am not going to sin.' From this latter formulation it follows that whether you sin or whether you do not sin, it will not be by necessity, because God foreknows that the one you are to do shall be done without necessity. Do you see now that it is not impossible for the foreknowledge of God (according to which we say that things foreknown by God are going to occur by necessity) to coexist with freedom of choice (according to which many things are done without necessity)? For if this is impossible, then a contradiction must follow. But no contradiction arises from this.

Perhaps you are thinking: 'When you say that because of God's foreknowledge it is necessary that I am going either to sin or not to sin without necessity, you still have not shown that my heart is free from the influence of necessity. For necessity seems to have the ring of coercion or restraint. And therefore, if it is necessary for me to sin willingly, I understand this to mean that some hidden force compels me to will to sin; and if I do not sin, I think it is because I am restrained by this force from willing to sin. For

this reason it seems to me that if I sin I sin by necessity, and if I do not sin it is by necessity that I do not sin.'

CHAPTER II

And I reply: We should realize that we often say it is necessary for something to occur even though there is nothing compelling it to occur, and that it is necessary for something not to occur even though there is nothing precluding it from occurring. We say, for instance, that it is necessary for God to be immortal and that it is necessary for God not to be unjust. But we do not mean that some power compels Him to be immortal or prevents Him from being unjust, because no power can prevent Him from being immortal or can compel Him to be unjust. Similarly, I say it is necessary that you are going to sin or not going to sin by your will alone--in accordance with God's foreknowledge. But this must not be understood to mean that something prevents your willing the action which is not going to occur or that something compels your willing the action which is going to occur. For God, who foresees what you are willingly going to do, foreknows that your will is not compelled or prevented by anything else; hence this activity of the will is free. If these things are carefully considered, I think it will be seen that no contradiction prevents us from affirming both the foreknowledge of God and freedom of choice.

Moreover, if one considers the proper meaning of the word 'foreknow,' he will see that when something is said to be foreknown, it is thus declared to be something that actually will occur. For since knowledge can be only of what is the case, one can foreknow only what is going to happen. Therefore, when I say, 'If God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be going to occur,' this is the same as saying, 'If something will occur, then necessarily it will occur.' But this necessity neither compels a thing to be nor prevents it from

being. And so by the very fact that something exists it is said necessarily to exist; and by the very fact that something does not exist it is said necessarily not to exist. In saying this we do not mean that some necessity is compelling this thing to exist or preventing it from not existing. For when I say, 'If a thing will be, then necessarily it will be,' this necessity follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence of the thing. The same thing would be true if I were to declare, 'What will be, necessarily will be.' For this necessity signifies nothing more than the impossibility that something will both be and not be at the same time.

Likewise, it is true that a thing's existence--past, present, or future--does not occur by necessity, and also that there is the necessity of its having been what it was or its being what it is or its going to be what it will be. Indeed, for a thing to be past is not the same as for a past thing to be past; nor is it the same thing for something to be present and for a present thing to be present, or for something to be future and for a future thing to be future--just as it is not the same for a thing to be white and for a white thing to be white. A piece of wood, for instance, is not necessarily white at all times, for before it became white it was possible for it not to become white, and after it has become white it is possible for it to become not-white. But a white piece of wood is necessarily white at all times, because neither before it existed nor after it existed as white, is it possible for something white to be not-white at the same time. In the same way, a thing may be existing in the present without necessity, since before it began to exist in the present it was possible for it not to exist and while it exists it is possible for it to cease existing in the present. But it is necessary for a present thing always to exist in the present--because neither before it existed nor after



it is present, is it possible for a present thing to be not-present at the same time.

In the same manner, there may be something--a certain action, let us say--that is going to occur without necessity, because before it occurs it is possible for it not to occur. But it is necessary that what is going to happen be going to happen, since what is going to happen cannot be not going to happen. As regards the past, it is true that a thing may have happened without necessity, since before it occurred it was possible for it not to occur. But likewise, it is necessary that what has happened has happened, since it is impossible that what has happened has not happened. Now, the past event has a characteristic which neither the present nor the future event has. For what is past can never become not-past as what is present can become not-present and as what is going to occur without necessity can be not going to occur. But when we say of what is going to occur that it is going to occur, this statement, like all other such statements, must be true--because what is going to happen cannot be not going to happen. So too, 'Every man is a man,' 'If he is a man he is a man,' 'Every white thing is white,' and 'If it is white it is white' are necessarily true statements because something cannot both be and not be at the same time. Certainly, if it is not necessary that everything which is going to be is going to be, then something which is going to happen is not going to happen--a self-contradiction. Necessarily, therefore, everything which is going to happen is going to happen; and when something is said to be going to happen and it really is going to happen, then necessarily it is going to happen. But the necessity here is subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to be.

CHAPTER III

However, a thing which we realize is going to happen need not in every

case happen by necessity; for if I assert, 'Tomorrow there is going to be a revolution in the country,' it does not follow that the revolution will occur by necessity. For before it occurs, it is possible for it not to occur, even though it will actually occur. Nonetheless, sometimes when we say that an event will occur, it is true that it will occur by necessity. An example of this is my stating 'The sun is going to rise tomorrow.' Therefore, if I state that something is necessarily going to occur, this may be understood in two ways: (1) in the way that tomorrow's revolution is necessarily going to occur or (2) in the way that tomorrow's sunrise is necessarily going to occur. For the revolution, which is not necessitated, is called necessary solely on the basis of subsequent necessity--since we are saying about what is going to occur that it is going to occur. For if tomorrow there is to be a revolution, then, necessarily, tomorrow there is to be a revolution. Tomorrow's sunrise, however, is understood to be something that will occur by two kinds of necessity, namely, by antecedent necessity, which causes the event to occur (according to which the event will occur because it is necessary that it occur) and by subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to occur (but according to which a thing that is to occur, necessarily is to occur).

Therefore, when we say of the events which God knows will occur that it is necessary for them to occur, we do not always mean that something is going to occur by necessity, but that something which is going to occur, necessarily is going to occur; for what is indeed going to occur cannot at the same time be something that will not occur. We mean the same thing when we say simply 'God foreknows such-and-such an event' without the additional statement, 'and this event is going to occur.' For to foreknow something implies that that thing is going to happen. Indeed, 'to foreknow' means nothing other than to know

what is going to occur. And so, if God foreknows something, then it is necessary that the thing occur. But it does not follow from the foreknowledge of God that the thing foreknown will in every case occur by necessity. For although He foreknows all future events, nevertheless He does not foreknow every future event as occurring by necessity. He foreknows that some things are going to occur through the free will of rational creatures.

We must note too that just as it is not necessary for God to will what He does, so in many cases it is not necessary for man to will what he does. And just as it is necessary that whatever God wills should occur; so also in the things which God places under the control of the human will, it is necessary that what man wills should occur. Accordingly, if a man wills something, it occurs, and if he does not will it, it does not occur. Now, it is impossible that what God wills should fail to occur. So when He wills that the will of man be neither compelled to will nor prevented from willing by any necessity, then it is necessary that man's will be free. And when God wills that the effect follow from the human will, it is necessary that what man wills should occur. Accordingly, although a man does not by necessity will sin, nevertheless when he does will to sin, a sinful act necessarily occurs. If one were to ask whether a sin committed by the will through its willing occurs necessarily, the answer must be that just as the will does not will necessarily, neither does the sin of the will occur necessarily. Nor does the will commit sin necessarily, because if it did not will freely, it would not act--even though, as I said above, what it does will, necessarily occurs. Now, to sin in this case is nothing other than to will what one ought not to will; so the sin of the will is not necessary, any more than willing a particular thing is necessary. But it is still true that if a man wills to sin, it is necessary

that he sin; but he does so by that necessity which, as I have explained above, does not compel or prevent anything.

Thus the free will chooses something which it is both able to keep from willing and also not able to keep from willing and which is therefore, necessary for it to will. For before it has willed, it is able not to will, because it is free; but once it has willed, it is no longer able to refrain from so willing, and thus it is necessary for it to will, because it is impossible for it both to will and not to will the same thing at the same time.

Now the will has been given the power to act in such a way that what it wills does occur and what it does not will does not occur. And this act is voluntary or free, because it arises from a free will. But this action is also necessary in a double sense: first, because it is compelled to happen by the will; and, secondly, because what is done by the will cannot at the same time not be done. These two kinds of necessity are produced by the freedom of the will, which can take account of them before they come to be. Now God, who knows all truth and only truth, sees all things just as they are--whether they be free or necessary; and conversely, all things exist in the way in which He sees them as existing. It is clear from these considerations that there is no inconsistency in maintaining both that God foreknows all things and that there are many things which, though having before they occur the possibility of never occurring, do actually occur through free will. Yet there is a certain manner in which these things occur by necessity; but this necessity, as I have said, derives from free will.

CHAPTER IV

There is another way to recognize that not all things which God foreknows occur by necessity but that some things occur by freedom of will. For this

can be seen from the fact that when God wills or causes something, it is undeniable that He knows what He wills or causes and that He foreknows what He shall will or shall cause. This is true whether God's willing and causing are understood in terms of the immutable present of eternity or in terms of the temporal order. (According to the former, nothing is past or future, but everything exists together without any change. In this regard we do not say that God has willed or has caused something or that He shall will or shall cause something; we say only that He does will or does cause something. But when we say that God shall will or shall cause something which we know has not yet been done, we are thinking of God's action in terms of the temporal order.) So then, if God's knowledge and foreknowledge impose necessity on all the things He knows and foreknows, then He Himself wills and causes nothing freely, but rather wills and causes all things by necessity [since His knowledge, or foreknowledge, imposes necessity upon His own will and also upon created things]. And so whether His willing and causing are understood in terms of the eternal order or in some temporal sense, they would be necessary. But if it is absurd to suppose that God wills and causes by necessity, then not everything which He knows or foreknows occurs by necessity. Therefore, there is nothing which prevents God's knowing or foreknowing something in our volitions and actions as occurring, whether now or in the future, through free choice. Thus, even though it is necessary that what He knows or foreknows should occur, nevertheless many things do occur without necessity and through free will, in the way I explained earlier.

Why should it be thought surprising that in this manner something exists both freely and by necessity, since there are many things which, seen from different points of view, have contrary characteristics? For what could be

more opposite than 'to come toward' and 'to go away from'? Yet we know that when someone goes from one place to another, the same movement is both 'coming toward' and 'going away from.' For in going away from one place he comes toward another. Or again, if we consider the sun, ever hastening to some part of the heavens in its journey across them, we see that the place from which it withdraws and the place to which it returns are the same. Moreover, we see that all the while the sun is approaching this place it is also leaving it. To those who are not unlearned it is also clear that with respect to the heavens the sun ever makes its transit from the western quarter to the eastern one, whereas with respect to the earth it only moves from east to west. Thus, the sun always moves both counter to the firmament and, although more slowly, with the firmament--as we notice with regard to all planets. √We see, then, that opposite characteristics may be ascribed to the same thing in different respects.⁷ For this reason there is no inconsistency in maintaining that something is necessarily going to happen (simply because it is going to happen) and also that it is not compelled to happen by necessity, except for the necessity with which, as I said before, an action follows from a free choice.

CHAPTER V

Someone might point to the statement which Job made to God concerning man, 'You have established his end, which cannot be escaped' (Job 14:5), and from this try to show, in spite of the fact that people sometimes seem to cause their own deaths by their own free will, that no one can hasten or change the day of his death. But this would not produce a valid argument against what we have said above. Now, since God cannot be deceived and since He sees only what is true--whether this results from necessity or from freedom--He is said to have established immutably within Himself the very thing which

within man can be changed before it occurs. Thus it is that the Apostle Paul says of those who are called to be saints according to God's purpose: 'Those whom He foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. For whom He predestined, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified.' (Rom. 1:7; 8:28,29) Now this purpose, according to which these men are called to be saints, is within eternity an immutable purpose, for within eternity there is no past or future but only a present; but in the men themselves this purpose is sometimes mutable because of human freedom of choice. For though we can only say that something within eternity does occur, never that it has occurred or will occur, still we do say without contradicting ourselves that a temporal event has occurred or will occur. Accordingly, it is possible to show without any inconsistency that a thing which is eternally immutable may sometimes, before it actually occurs, be mutable within time because of free will.

Even though nothing exists within eternity except the present, nevertheless this is not a temporal present as we know it but an eternal present in which the whole of time is contained. Just as the temporal present encompasses every place and everything whatsoever that is occurring in these places, so too does the eternal present contain the whole of time and everything which is in time. Thus, when the Apostle declares that God foreknew, predestined, called, justified, and glorified his saints, we must understand that none of these occurs earlier or later than the others for God, but that all of them are together at once within an eternal present. For eternity has its own present and encompasses all the things that occur at the same time and place, and at different times and places.

In order to show that he was not using these words in their temporal signification, the same Apostle used verbs in the past tense to refer even to future events. For, temporally speaking, God has not already called, justified, and glorified those whom He foreknows are still to be born. From this we can see that for want of a verb that would adequately signify the eternal present, the Apostle used verbs of past tense; for things which are temporally past are altogether immutable, and in this way resemble the eternal present. In this respect the temporal past is more like the eternal present than the temporal present. For what is temporally past can never be not-past just as what is eternally present can never be not-present; but all temporally present things which pass away with time do become not-present.

Accordingly, Holy Scripture speaks of everything that occurs through free choice as if it were necessary. In this way it speaks in accordance with the eternal order, where all truth and only truth is present immutably. It does not speak in accordance with the temporal order, wherein our volitions and actions do not exist forever. Indeed, it is not necessary that our volitions and actions exist before such time as they do exist; moreover it is often not even necessary that they should exist at any time. For example, I am not engaged in writing all the time, nor do I always want to write. Now, when I am not writing or wanting to write, it is not necessary for me to write or to want to write. By the same token there is no necessity that I should ever write or want to write.

A thing's existence in time is so different from its existence in eternity that at a given moment something may not be present in time which is present in eternity or something may be past in time without being past in eternity or may be future in time without being future in eternity. When we realize this,

we have no basis for denying that something can be mutable in time while being immutable in eternity. Indeed, something's being mutable in time and immutable in eternity is no more contradictory than something's not existing at a certain time but always existing in eternity, or its having been or its going to be in the order of time what it always is in the order of eternity.

I am not saying that something which always exists in eternity never exists in time, but only that there are moments in time when such a thing does not exist. I would not say, for instance, that my actions tomorrow never occur at any time; I merely deny that they are occurring today, even though their occurrence is forever present in eternity. Similarly, when we deny of something which was or will be in time that it ever was or will be in eternity, we are not claiming that what was or will be has no existence of any kind in eternity; we are only pointing out that what exists there unceasingly in its own eternal-present mode does not exist there in the past or future mode. There seems to be no contradiction in this. Thus there is also no contradiction in saying that something is mutable in time, prior to its occurrence, and that it remains immutable in eternity, where nothing exists before or after but everything exists continually. For nothing exists in eternity according to temporal modes. And there exists there even the eternal fact of something's temporal existence and of its being possible not to exist before it actually does come into existence. I think it is sufficiently clear from what I have said that there is no mutual incompatibility whatsoever between the foreknowledge of God and free choice. This is due to the very nature of eternity, which encompasses all time and everything whatsoever that exists at any time.

CHAPTER VI

Inasmuch as we do not have free choice in all things, we must determine

the nature and scope of the freedom of choice which we believe man always has, and we must say something about the nature of choice. For choice and freedom of choice are not the same thing. In many cases we speak of both freedom and choice. We say, for example, that someone is free to speak or to remain silent and that he has the choice of doing whichever he prefers. Freedom and choice are likewise said to be present in many other instances where they are not always present or where they are not necessary to the salvation of our souls. But I am considering only that choice and freedom whose use is indispensable for man's salvation. Now many people complain bitterly because they think that free choice has nothing to do with their salvation or damnation, which they regard as solely a matter of necessity following from the foreknowledge of God. Inasmuch as man, after he reaches the age of understanding, can be saved only if he is just, we must examine choice and the freedom from which choice is exercised in order to determine where the seat of justice is. But first we must explain what justice is, and then we can go on to discuss freedom and choice.

Any justice whatever, great or small, is uprightness of will kept for its own sake. And freedom is the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake. I think I have already clearly explicated these definitions, first in the treatise I published Concerning Truth and then again in the treatise On Freedom of Choice. In the latter I showed that this freedom belongs to man naturally and inseparably, even though he does not always use it. I also showed that this freedom is so strong that as long as a man wills to use it, nothing can take away the uprightness (that is, the justice) which he possesses. Justice indeed is not a natural possession, but in the beginning it was something separable in both the angels in Heaven and man in Paradise. And even now it exists in this life, not by necessity but by the proper willing of those who

possess it. Now, as I said, the justice by which a person is just consists in the uprightness of his will; and this uprightness is in a person only when he wills what God wills him to will. Hence it is clear that God cannot take a man's uprightness away from him against his will, for God cannot will such a thing. But neither can He will that the man who possesses uprightness should by reason of some necessity desert that uprightness unwillingly. If God did will this, He would be willing the man not to will the uprightness He wills him to will--which is impossible. It follows, therefore, that in this way God wills that the upright will be free to will rightly and to keep its uprightness. And when the will is able actually to do what it wills to do, then it does freely what it does. This, therefore, is another very clear way to see that there are wills which are free in their actions without contradicting the foreknowledge of God--a truth I demonstrated earlier.

Let us now postulate the case of a man in whom there appears (1) an upright, or just, will, (2) freedom of choice, and (3) an actual choice. Let us consider how the upright will might be so attacked that it would desert uprightness, and how it might keep uprightness by free choice. Let us say that someone wishes in his heart to cling to the truth because he knows that it is right to love truth. He has, then, an upright will, or uprightness of will. We must bear in mind that the will itself is one thing, and the uprightness by which it is upright is another. Now suppose that someone approaches this man and threatens to kill him unless he tells a lie. He now has the choice of either forsaking life in favor of uprightness or deserting uprightness in order to live. This choice, or judgment, is free; for reason, which apprehends uprightness, teaches that uprightness ought always to be cherished for its own sake, and that anything set before the will to entice it to forsake uprightness

should be despised. And the function of the will is to choose or not to choose in accordance with what reason apprehends. Indeed, it is to this end that reason and will are given in the highest degree to rational creatures. Wherefore the choice of the will to desert uprightness is not compelled by any necessity, even though the choice is made under pain of death. For even though it is necessary for the person to relinquish either his life or his uprightness, there is no necessity which determines which one he should either keep or forsake. Indeed, in such a case the will alone determines which one he keeps; and no one acts by necessity when he acts solely through the choice of his will. It is obvious that a person who is under no necessity of forsaking uprightness of will does not lack the ability to keep uprightness, that is, does not lack freedom. For this ability is always free. And freedom, as I have said, is the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake. Because rational nature possesses this freedom it is said to have both free choice and free will.

CHAPTER VII

We have still another question to consider. Since God is believed to know or foreknow all things, does His knowledge derive from the things He knows, or do the things derive their existence from His knowledge? If God derives His knowledge from things, it follows that they are prior to His knowledge and thus are not from Him, for they could not come from God without also coming from His knowledge. But if, on the other hand, everything that exists receives its being from the knowledge of God, then God is the author and creator of evil, and is unjust in punishing evil creatures. This belief, however, we do not accept.

The issue can easily be resolved if we first recognize that the good which is justice is really something positive--whereas the evil which is injustice

altogether lacks existence. I have shown this most clearly in the treatise on The Fall of Satan and the treatise entitled On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin. Injustice is neither a quality nor an action nor a being, but merely the absence of due justice; and injustice is located only in the will, where justice ought to be. Now each rational nature and every action of that nature is called just or unjust according to whether the will is just or unjust. Certainly, every quality, every action, and anything whatsoever that has being comes from God, who is the source of all justice and from whom comes no injustice. God, then, is the Creator of everything that becomes just or unjust through the will, that is, of everything which becomes a good or an evil work. But whereas God causes the existence and the goodness of good things, He causes only the existence, and not the evil, of evil things. For anything to be just, or good, is for it to be something positive; but for something to be unjust, or evil, is not for it to be anything positive. If being good, or just, is having justice, which is something positive, then being evil, or unjust, is not having the justice one ought to have. And this not-having is not something positive; for while justice is something, injustice, as I have said, is nothing.

Now there is another kind of good, which we call 'benefit' (commodum); and we call the corresponding evil 'disadvantage' (incommodum). This evil is in some cases nothing, as with blindness; but sometimes it is something positive, as in the case of pain. When this evil is something positive, we do not deny that God causes it, because He is 'the One who makes peace and creates evil.' (Isaiah 45:7) For He creates hardships and uses them to train and purify the just, and to punish the unjust. We may be sure, however, that the evil according to which a man is called unjust, namely injustice, is never something positive. Nor is it anything positive for a thing to be unjust. Now even as

God does not cause injustice, neither does He cause anything to be unjust. But He does cause all actions and all movements, in that He causes the things from which, out of which, by which, and in which they come to be. Every creature possesses only such power to will or to do anything as God has given. Willing--which is sometimes just, sometimes unjust--is nothing other than using the will and the ability to will which God gives. Thus, willing, insofar as it is, is something good and is from God. Now, when the ability to will is used rightly, it is something good and just; but when it is not used rightly, then in this respect (and only in this respect) is it something evil and unjust. Existing rightly is something positive and is from God, whereas not existing rightly is not something positive and is not from God. When a person uses a sword, for instance, or uses language, or the power of speaking, it is the same sword or language or power whether he uses it correctly or incorrectly. The same is true of the will. As with reason, which we use for reasoning, so the will is not one thing when we use it correctly and something different when we use it incorrectly. A substance or an action is said to be just or unjust according to the will. But what the will essentially is, is neither more nor less when it is just than when it is unjust. Thus, God causes both the essential being and the goodness of all good wills and all good works. And He causes the essential being of all evil wills and evil works, but He does not cause their being evil. For just as a thing's being is from God alone, so its rightness is from Him alone.

Injustice, which is the absence of the uprightness we are discussing, is located only in the will of rational creatures, who ought always to have justice. But why does a rational creature not have that which he ought always to have, and how does God cause good things solely by His goodness and evil things solely through the fault of man or Satan? And how does man do good through free choice

when he is assisted by grace, and yet do evil by the working of his own will alone? What part can God play in evil works without being culpable, and how are we to understand man's praiseworthiness in performing good works, when his good works seemingly must be attributed to God and his evil works to himself? I think that with the help of God these issues will become much clearer when we come to deal with the question of grace and free choice. For the moment I shall simply say that the evil angel does not possess justice, because he abandoned it and has not since regained it. Man also is without justice, because in his first parents he threw it away; and in the time since then he either has not recovered it or, having once recovered it, he has once again thrown it away.

I think that with the help of God's grace we have now shown that the foreknowledge of God and free choice both exist at the same time. If what we have said is carefully considered, it will be clear that this compatibility is not impossible. And there is no objection against this truth which cannot be satisfactorily answered.

Question Two: On Predestination and Free Choice

CHAPTER I

Trusting in God, who has led us every step thus far, let us now attempt to resolve the conflict which seems to exist between predestination and free choice. We have already made not a little progress in this direction regarding the things which we have expounded above. This will become quite evident in the ensuing chapters.

It seems that predestination is the same thing as foreordination or pre-determination; and so God is understood to foreordain anything that He predestines--or in other words, to determine that it shall occur. Hence it seems

that what God determines to be going to exist, necessarily must be going to exist. Whatever God predestines, then, necessarily will be. So, if God predestines both the good and the evil actions which occur, then every action occurs by necessity and nothing occurs through free choice. If, on the other hand, God predestines only good actions, then only good actions occur by necessity and there is free choice only in regard to evil things--a view which is completely absurd. Consequently, God does not predestine only good deeds. Now, if the good works that make men just occur through free choice without being predestined, then God does not predestine all the good works which make men just. In this case He would not predestine men who are just through their works of free choice. So then, God would not foreknow them either, because 'whom He foreknew, them He also predestined.' (Rom. 8:29) But it is false to say that there are good works or just men that God does not foreknow. Therefore, it is not the case that certain good works done by free choice alone serve to justify men; rather only those good works which God predestines justify men. Thus, if God predestines everything and if everything that is predestined occurs by necessity, then since nothing which occurs through free choice occurs by necessity, it seems to follow that as long as predestination remains in effect, there is no free choice. Or else it seems to follow that if we can establish some area of free choice, in that area predestination seems to be inoperative.

CHAPTER II

Before I answer this question, it is especially important to notice that predestination does not apply only to good actions. It can also be said to apply to evil actions--just as God can be said to cause the evil deeds which He does not Himself do but which He permits to occur. For example, God is

said to harden a man's heart when He does nothing to soften it, and He is said to lead a man into temptation when He does not deliver him from it. So then, it is the same sort of thing to say that God predestines evil men and their evil works when He does not correct these men and their evil works. But in a special way God is said to foreknow and predestine good things, because, as I said above, He causes both their being and their being good--whereas in evil things He causes only their essential being, not their being evil. We should also understand that like foreknowledge, predestination is not properly attributed to God. For there is no before or after in God, but all things are present to Him at once.

CHAPTER III

Let us now consider whether some things can be predestined to occur through free choice. We must never suppose that there is a conflict between God's foreknowledge and predestination, for God predestines a thing exactly as He foreknows it. When dealing with the question of foreknowledge, we saw clearly that there is no contradiction in saying that some things are foreknown to occur through free choice. From this we now derive another truth no less evident, for reason tells us that there is no contradiction in saying that some things are predestined to occur through free choice. For God neither foreknows nor predestines anyone to be just by necessity. Anyone who does not keep justice by his free will does not really have justice. Therefore, although it is necessary that what is foreknown and what is predestined should occur, nevertheless some of the things foreknown and predestined do not occur by the necessity which precedes a thing and causes it, but only by the necessity which (as I said above) follows the thing's occurrence. Even though God predestines the will, He does not cause it to do anything by compelling or restraining it; He merely leaves

it to its own power. Although man's will uses its own power, it does nothing which God by His grace does not cause in good actions, and which in evil actions He causes not by His grace but by the fault of the human will. As I promised, these things will become clearer when we speak of grace. Now just as foreknowledge cannot be mistaken and foreknows only what will really occur--whether freely or by necessity--so also predestination cannot be altered and predestines only in accordance with foreknowledge. And just as what is foreknown is immutable in eternity but can nevertheless be changed in time at any moment before it comes to be, the same is true of all things which are predestined.

It should be clear now to anyone who carefully considers what I have said that predestination does not exclude free choice and that free choice is not opposed to predestination. Indeed, all the foregoing arguments that were used to show that free choice is not inconsistent with foreknowledge show equally clearly that free choice is compatible with predestination. Thus, when something happens through the free operation of the will, such as the infliction of a fatal injury by one man on another, we see how unreasonable it is for people to say, as they do so often and with such clamor, "God foreknew and predestined that this act should occur in the way it did; so it was committed by necessity and couldn't have been otherwise." After all, neither the man who inflicts the injury nor the one who defends himself acts from necessity. Both act solely through the will, for had they not willed freely what they did, neither would have done what he did.

Question III: Concerning Grace and Free Choice

CHAPTER I

We must now consider the question of grace and free choice, and we must do so with the help of this very grace. The question arises from the fact that

Holy Scripture speaks in places as if free choice could contribute nothing to salvation, intimating that salvation comes through grace alone; while in other passages it speaks as if our salvation depended entirely upon our free will. For example, the Lord says concerning grace, 'Without me ye can do nothing' (John 15:5), and 'No one comes to me unless my Father draws him.' (John 6:44) And the apostle Paul says, 'What do you have that you have not received?' (I Cor. 4:7) He also says, speaking of God, 'He has mercy on whom He wills to have mercy and whom He will He hardens.' (Rom. 9:18) Also, 'It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy.' (Rom. 9:16) Besides these there are many other passages which seem to attribute our good works and our salvation to grace alone apart from free choice. Moreover, many people even claim that they can show by experience that man is not at all kept upright through free choice. They see a great many individuals who make an immense effort of body and mind but are hindered by some difficulty, or even impossibility, so that they either make no progress, or having made great progress, suddenly and irretrievably fall back.

Scripture, however, teaches that we do have free choice. For God says through Isaiah, 'If you are willing and will hearken unto me, you shall eat the good things of the land.' (Isaiah 1:19) And David says, 'Who is the man who wishes life, who loves many days so that he may see good things? Keep your tongue from evil and your lips from speaking quile; turn away from evil and do good.' (Ps. 34:12-14) And the Lord says in the Gospel, 'Come unto me all ye who are laboring and are heavily laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and you shall find rest for your souls.' (Matt. 11:28,29) There are countless other passages which seem to urge free choice to good works and to reproach it for

spurning their admonitions. Now divine authority would never do this if it knew that there were no freedom of the will in man. Nor would it be possible for God justly to reward good and evil men according to their merits if they had done nothing good or evil through free choice.

Since we find in Holy Scripture certain passages which seem to favor the doctrine of grace alone, and other passages which seem to hold that free choice can stand alone without grace, there have been certain arrogant men who have thought that the whole efficacy of moral perfection derives entirely from freedom of choice; while in our day there are many who have completely given up on the idea that there is such a thing as free choice. In this question, therefore, it will be our purpose to show that free choice exists together with grace and actually cooperates with it in many lives--just as we discovered earlier that free choice is compatible with foreknowledge and predestination.

CHAPTER II

We should bear in mind that just as in our discussion of this question up to this point we have not been concerned with free choice in general but only with that free choice which is indispensable to meriting salvation after one has reached the age of understanding, so now we are concerned only with that grace which is indispensable for man's salvation. Every creature exists by grace, because he has been created by grace. Besides this, there are many good things in this life which man does not need for salvation, but which God gives him by grace. Now, the harmony that we are seeking does not appear in infants who die after they have been baptized but before they have been able to use their free choice, because in them grace alone effects salvation without any exercise of free choice on their part. For it is by grace that others are given the desire to let their faith assist these infants. Therefore, we must direct our

inquiry toward those who have reached the age of understanding, because the issue deals only with them.

There is no doubt that all those in this number who are saved are saved through justice, because eternal life is promised to the just. For 'The just will live forever and their reward is with the Lord.' (Wisdom of Solomon 5:15) Sacred authority often points out that justice is uprightness of will. It suffices to cite only one example of this. David says, 'The Lord will not cast off His people nor forsake His inheritance until judgment shall return to justice.' (Ps. 94:14,15) But after he had said this, he asked the following question in order to teach us what justice is: 'And who is conformed to justice?' To this he replies, 'Everyone who is upright in heart,' which means everyone who is upright in will. For though we believe and understand by the heart--even as we will by the heart--the Holy Spirit does not judge a man to have an upright heart when he believes and understands rightly but does not will rightly. This is because such a man does not use the uprightness of faith and of understanding for that end for which they have been given to rational creatures, namely, for upright willing. No one should be said to have right understanding when he does not use this understanding to will rightly. Nor should anyone be said to have faith, except a dead faith, when he does not use this faith for the purpose for which it is given, namely to will upright deeds. For this reason we are right to understand David as identifying the upright in heart with the upright in will. But lest someone suppose Divine authority to teach that a man is just, or upright, when he keeps uprightness of will as a means to something else, we insist that justice is uprightness of will kept for its own sake. For a man who keeps uprightness only for the sake of something else really loves, not uprightness, but that object for the sake of which he is

keeping uprightness. Accordingly, we should never call this man just, and we should never say that such uprightness is justice.

When we were dealing with the relationship of foreknowledge to free choice, we showed by a particular example that it is possible for this uprightness, which I call justice, to coexist with free choice. Through this example one can plainly see that the same thing can be true of many other cases. Thus, if we can show that no creature can obtain uprightness without grace, the harmony we are seeking between grace and free choice in the work of saving man will be manifest.

CHAPTER III

There is certainly no doubt that the will wills rightly only because it itself is upright. No man's sight is acute because he sees clearly; rather, a man sees clearly because his sight is acute. So too, the will is not upright because it wills rightly, but rather it wills rightly because it is itself upright. There is no doubt that when a man wills uprightness he wills rightly. Therefore, he wills uprightness only because his will is upright. But it is the same for the will to be upright and for it to have uprightness. Thus it is clear that a man wills uprightness only because he has uprightness. I do not deny that an upright will wills an uprightness which it does not yet have when it wills more uprightness than it already has. But I maintain that no one can will this uprightness if he has no uprightness at all by which to will it.

Let us now consider whether someone who does not have this uprightness can obtain it in some way from himself. If he has it from himself, he must have it either by willing it or without willing it. Now, no one is able by willing uprightness to obtain it through his own efforts, since he cannot

will it unless he already has it. And no sound mind can believe that someone who does not have uprightness of will should be able without willing it to obtain it through his own efforts. Therefore, there is no way for a creature to have uprightness from himself. Furthermore, no creature is able to have it from another creature. For it is just as impossible for one creature to give to another the necessary means of salvation as it is for one creature to save another. It follows, therefore, that only by the grace of God can a creature have the uprightness of will that I have been discussing. We have demonstrated, however, that this uprightness can be kept through free choice. So with the bountiful help of God we have found that His grace works harmoniously with free choice for the salvation of man. Thus, grace alone can save man when there is no free choice exercised, as in the case of infants. But in those who have reached the age of understanding, grace always helps the natural free choice by giving to the will the uprightness which it can keep through free choice--for without grace free choice can do nothing effective for salvation.

And although God does not give His grace to everyone, since 'He has mercy on whom He wills to have mercy, and whom He will He hardens' (Rom. 9:18), nevertheless He does not give grace to anyone as a reward for some antecedent merit, for 'Who has first given to God and shall be recompensed by Him?' (Rom. 11:35) If, however, the will through free choice keeps what it has received and in this way merits either an increment of received justice, or even power for a good will, or some other reward, then any reward it earns is the fruit of the first grace. (John 1:16) The bestowing of these rewards, then, really amounts to the giving of grace for grace. Consequently, everything must be attributed to grace, for willing and running are 'not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy.' (Rom. 9:16) For the

following statement from Scripture is addressed to everyone except God alone:

'What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?' (I Cor. 4:7)

CHAPTER IV

I believe that in the treatise On Freedom of Choice I explained how a free will which has received the gift of uprightness is not compelled by any necessity to forsake uprightness, but how it yields willingly and not without consent when it is assailed by the difficulties of temptation. Now, because grace helps the will in such a multitude of ways, I shall not be able to enumerate all of them. But it will be worthwhile for me to say something about the ways in which the received grace helps free choice to keep uprightness after the will has received it.

It is obvious that no one can keep this received uprightness without willing to do so. But a person cannot will uprightness unless he possesses it. And the only way he can possess it is by grace. Now just as no one receives uprightness unless grace precedes it and enables him, so no one keeps uprightness unless the same grace follows it and helps him. Even though the keeping of uprightness, when it is kept, is a work of free choice, this keeping must not be attributed to free choice so much as to grace; for free choice possesses uprightness only through prevenient grace and keeps it only through subsequent grace.

Grace so follows its own gift that it fails to bestow this gift of uprightness, whether it be great or small, only when free choice by willing something else deserts the uprightness it has received. For uprightness is never separated from the will except when the will chooses something else that is incompatible with uprightness--as happens, for instance, when someone who receives

the uprightness of willing sobriety throws it away by immoderately willing the pleasures of drinking. When a man does something like this, he does it of his own will; so through his own fault he loses the grace which he has received. When free choice is assailed by a temptation to forsake the uprightness it has received, grace still helps the will by reducing or completely nullifying the power of the temptation besetting it, or by increasing the will's desire for uprightness. Furthermore, since all things are subject to the governance of God, then everything that happens to man which helps free choice to receive or to keep the uprightness we are talking about ought to be imputed entirely to grace.

I have said that all justice is uprightness of will kept for its own sake. It follows from this that everyone who has this uprightness has justice; and since everyone who has justice is just, everyone who has uprightness is just. Nevertheless I do not believe that eternal life has been promised to all who are just but only to those who are just without being at all unjust. For it is the latter who are properly and absolutely said to be just and upright in heart. There are some people who are just in one respect and unjust in another, such as the man who is both chaste and envious. The happiness of the just is not given to people like this. For as true happiness exists without any deficiency, so it is given only to the person who is just without being unjust in any way. The happiness promised to the just will be similar to that enjoyed by the angels of God. Thus, since there is no injustice in the good angels, no one who has any injustice will be admitted to their company. It is not the purpose of our present discourse to show how a man can become free of injustice; but we know that by the grace of God and through holy endeavors, this is possible for the Christian.

CHAPTER V

Anyone who carefully considers what has been said will recognize clearly that when Holy Scripture says something in favor of grace, it is not flatly denying the role of free choice. And when Scripture says something in favor of free choice it does not exclude grace--as if grace alone or free choice alone were sufficient for man's salvation, as those who pose this question think. The divine words should be understood to mean that neither grace alone nor free choice alone can accomplish man's salvation (with the exception of what I said about the salvation of infants).

When the Lord says 'Without me you can do nothing' (John 15:5), He certainly is not saying 'Your free choice is of no avail to you' but only 'It is of no avail without my grace.' When we read, 'It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy' (Rom. 9:16), Scripture is not denying that free choice does something useful in a man who wills or runs; it is rather signifying that the willing and the running are not to be attributed to free choice but to grace. For 'It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs' should be understood as referring to the act of willing and act of running. The same sort of thing happens when someone gives a garment to a naked man to whom he owes nothing, but who is unable to obtain any clothing by himself. Even though the naked man has the power to use or not to use the garment he receives, nevertheless if he actually puts it on, then the fact that he is clothed should not be imputed to him but to the man who gave it to him. Wherefore, we can say, 'The fact that he is clothed is not of him who is clothed, but of him who shows mercy, that is, of him who gives the garment.' This could be said much more emphatically of the one who gave the garment if he had also given the ability to keep and to use it. This is the case with God.

When He gives man the uprightness we have so often mentioned, He also gives him the ability to keep and to use it; for before He gave man uprightness He gave him free choice for the purpose of keeping and using uprightness. Now if, since no one owed the naked man anything, everyone had refused to give him any clothing, or if he himself had thrown the garment away after receiving it, then his nakedness could be imputed only to himself. Thus when God gives the ability to will or to run to someone conceived and born in sin, to whom He owes nothing but punishment, this ability 'is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy.' As for the one who does not accept that grace or, having once accepted it, spurns it: it is his own fault, not God's, that he continues in his hardness and his iniquity.

The same interpretation must be given to other passages in which Scripture speaks in favor of grace, namely, that free choice is not excluded. Similarly, when the divine words speak in such a way that they seem to attribute man's salvation solely to free choice, no one should understand this to mean that grace is excluded from this work. Even though offspring are not naturally begotten solely by a mother, still no understanding of procreation excludes either father or mother from the generation of children. Similarly, grace and free choice are not incompatible but work together for the justification and salvation of man.

CHAPTER VI

When Scripture appears to exhort free choice in various matters to will and to work uprightly, one wonders why it summons men to right willing and why it condemns those who do not obey, since no one can have or receive uprightness unless God gives him grace. We should note that whereas the earth produces innumerable herbs and trees, none of which have any nutritive value for

man while some may even kill him, and whereas these grow without having to be cared for by men, the earth brings forth the vegetation we need most for bodily nourishment only when someone plants seeds and labors strenuously over them. In the same way, without effort or needing to be taught, human hearts freely germinate, as it were, thoughts and inclinations which are entirely useless--perhaps even harmful--for salvation. But unless a unique seed is planted within and unless that seed is laboriously cultivated, human hearts never conceive or generate the thoughts and inclinations which we cannot do without if we are to make any progress toward the salvation of our souls. For this reason the Apostle calls those men on whom such care is lavished 'God's husbandry.' (I Cor. 3:9) The seed of this husbandry is the word of God--or better, not the word itself but the meaning which the word carries. For the sound of the word apart from its meaning accomplishes nothing in a man's heart. Moreover, the seed of upright willing comprises not just the meaning of the word of God but also every meaning and sense of uprightness that the human mind can apprehend by hearing, reading, reasoning, or in any way whatsoever.

No one can will what he does not first apprehend in his heart. Now, to will to believe what should be believed is to will uprightly. But no one can will this if he does not know what should be believed. For when the Apostle proclaimed, 'Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved,' he added, 'How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach except they be sent?' (Rom. 10:18, 14) And a little later he says, 'Therefore faith comes by hearing and hearing by the word of Christ.' We should not understand the statement 'Faith comes by hearing' to mean that faith comes from what the mind apprehends or conceives

through hearing in the sense that the mind's conception produces faith in man, but only in the sense that there can be no faith without some rational conception. Faith comes into being when, by grace, uprightness of willing is added to the conception, because then a man believes what he hears. 'And hearing comes by the word of Christ,' that is, by the word of those who preach Christ. To be sure, there are no preachers unless they are sent. But the fact that they are sent is due to grace. Therefore, preaching is grace, since what derives from grace is also grace; and hearing is grace, and the understanding which comes from hearing is grace, and uprightness of willing is grace. But sending, preaching, hearing, and understanding come to naught unless the will wills what the mind understands. But the will cannot do this unless it has received uprightness. For one wills uprightly when he wills what he ought to will. Thus, what the mind apprehends or conceives through hearing the word is the seed planted in the mind by preaching; and uprightness is the growth which God gives. For without God there would be no growth, for 'neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but only God, who gives the growth.' (I Cor. 3:7)

Just as in the beginning God miraculously--without using seeds or the help of a cultivator--made grain and other things to grow from the earth for the nourishment of men, so also miraculously--without the use of human teaching--He made the Gospels and the hearts of the apostles and prophets rich in the seeds which give salvation. From these seeds we receive whatever we sow in God's husbandry for the nourishment of our souls--just as we now possess from among the first seeds of the earth only those which we cultivate for the nourishment of our bodies. Nothing that we preach is effective for salvation except what Holy Scripture, made fruitful by the miracle of the Holy Spirit, has brought forth and contains. Now if at times we cannot clearly show that a view we

affirm by reason is also in Scripture, or if we cannot prove it from what Scripture says, then in one way we can still learn through Scripture whether such a view should be accepted or rejected. For Scripture opposes no truth and favors no falsity. So if a view is adopted on the basis of a clear reason and if this view is not contradicted in any part of Scripture, then it may be said to be supported by the authority of Scripture, for Scripture does not contradict what is said by reason. But even though our reason may seem unassailable to us, we should not believe that it is supported by any truth if Scripture is obviously opposed to our rational understanding of something. Thus when Holy Scripture either affirms clearly or does not at all deny what reason teaches, it contains the authority for all the truth which reason apprehends.

Let us now consider some examples which show how the word is the seed. When people hear it said, 'If you are willing and will hearken unto me' (Isaiah 1:19), they understand and believe that what is meant is willing and hearing, or obeying. For a person who hears but does not obey cannot really be said to hear. One cannot obey, however, unless he wills. Now, to will to obey is to will uprightly. But no one is able to will uprightly unless he has uprightness of will; and a person has such uprightness only by grace. Moreover, uprightness in willing something is given only to the person who understands both what it is to will and what he ought to will. We see, therefore, that the word, 'If you are willing and will hearken unto me,' is in no way a seed that bears fruit by itself without uprightness being added to it; and uprightness is given only by means of such seeds, or words.

Similarly, when God says 'Be converted to me' (Isaiah 45:22), these words are a seed which bears no fruit as long as God does not turn the will of man toward willing conversion. A man thinks of conversion when he hears the command

'Be converted'; and without the seed of this word no one can will to be converted. The command, 'Be converted,' is addressed even to those who are already converted, with the idea either that they become converted even more or that they preserve what has already been converted in them. Those who say 'Convert us, O Lord' (Ps. 85:4), are already in some sense converted; for anyone who wills to be converted already has an upright will. On the basis of the conversion they have already received, they are praying that their conversion may grow--in the same way that those who were already believers once asked, 'Increase our faith.' (Luke 17:5) It is as if both the former and the latter were praying 'Increase in us what you have given; perfect what you have begun.' What I have shown to be true in these instances also applies in examples similar to them.

So then, just as the earth does not without seeds naturally bring forth those things which are most necessary to the health of our bodies, neither does the soil of the human heart bring forth the fruit of faith or of justice without the appropriate seeds. Furthermore, even though God does not give growth to all the seeds that are planted, nevertheless farmers continue to plant seeds in the hope of reaping some small harvest. Similarly, God instructs His workers most urgently to plant the seed of His word in hope, even though God does not cause every seed of faith and justice to grow. We have now shown, I think, why it is not superfluous to invite men to faith in Christ and to the things which faith demands, even though not everyone accepts the invitation.

CHAPTER VII

I have said that it is even possible to ask why those who do not accept the Word of God should be blamed, since they are unable to accept it unless grace directs their wills. For the Lord says, speaking about the Holy Spirit, 'He accuses the world of sin because they do not believe in me.' (John 16:8,9)

Although it may be difficult to reply to this question, I ought not to keep to myself what insight God grants me. We should note that the inability which results from one's own fault does not, so long as the fault remains, excuse the man who has the inability. Even in infants, therefore, God demands that human nature have the justice which it received in its first parents and which was accompanied by the ability of every future generation to keep justice. So the inability to have justice does not excuse human nature, for human nature fell into this inability through its own fault. The inability of human nature to have justice consists in its not having what it cannot regain by itself [viz., justice]. Human nature fell into this inability because it freely deserted what it was able to keep. Therefore, since it deserted justice by sinning, the inability which it brought upon itself by sinning, is counted as sin. In those who are not baptized, not only the inability to have justice but even the inability to understand it is counted as sin, for this inability has also resulted from sin.

We can also reasonably assert that the diminishment and corruption of the dignity, strength, and beauty of man's original condition is his own fault. Insofar as it was able, human nature diminished the honor and glory of God by sinning. Indeed, the wisdom of the Creator is proclaimed and praised according to the dignity of His work. Now, human nature is the precious work of God and He should have been glorified for it. Therefore, to the extent that human nature itself diminished and degraded that work in its own being, to this degree it dishonored God by its own fault. And man committed a sin of such magnitude that only the death of God is able to blot it out.

On account of the sin of Adam we are subject, like the brute animals, to those passions and appetites which the Apostle calls 'the flesh' and 'concupis-

cence.' (Rom. 7:7,8) He reveals that he himself experienced these desires against his will; for he says 'What I hate, that I do' (Rom. 7:15), by which he means 'I unwillingly have covetous desires.' Sacred authority shows us quite clearly that these passions and appetites are to be counted as sin. Certainly when the Lord says of the passion of anger, even when it occurs without words or actions, 'Whoever is angry with his brother will be answerable for it at the judgment' (Matt. 5:22), He shows clearly that the blame for such anger is no trifling matter but is of such gravity that it is followed by the condemnation of death. It is as if He had said, 'Whoever does what man ought not to do and what man would not do had he not sinned, ought to be removed from the midst of men.' Furthermore, Paul declares of those who unwillingly experience the desires of the flesh (that is, experience concupiscent desires), 'There is no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh' (that is, to those who do not consent to the flesh willingly). (Rom. 8:1) Now there is no doubt that he is signifying that condemnation will follow for those who are not in Christ, as often as they feel the desires of the flesh, even if they do not walk according to the flesh. For man was so made that he ought not to feel these desires--just as he ought never (as I said) to feel anger. Anyone who diligently considers what I have said will have no doubt that the men who, because of their own fault, cannot accept the Word of God, will be rightly blamed for it.

CHAPTER VIII

As regards those to whom the grace of Christian faith is given: just as in baptism the original injustice with which they are born is removed, so also in baptism there is forgiven all guilt of inability and of total corruption, which was incurred as a result of the sin of the first parent and through which

God is dishonored. For even though the corruption and the appetites which are the penalty of sin are not immediately erased after baptism, no guilt which was in them before baptism is charged to them after baptism; nor is any transgression imputed to them except that which they commit by their own will. It appears from this that the corruption and evil which were the penalty of sin and which still remain after baptism, are not in themselves sins. For injustice alone is a sin in itself. Until injustice has been remitted, the things which follow from injustice are considered sins by reason of their cause. For if they had really been sins they would have been blotted out in baptism, where all sins are washed away by the blood of Christ. Moreover, were they properly called sins, they would be sins even in the brute animals. For on account of sin human nature endures these penalties which make it resemble the nature of the brute animals.

There is something else which can be recognized in the first sin of human nature and which we ought greatly to fear. Man is a 'spirit that goes out but does not return.' (Ps. 78:39) For this reason, after he freely falls (we are speaking for the moment only of voluntary sins), there is no way that he can rise up again unless grace uplifts him. Unless he is restrained by God's mercy, his own effort results only in his being plunged down into the bottomless abyss (or measureless depth) of sin, from one sin to another, in such a way that even the good becomes something hateful to him and something that will mean death for him. Thus it is that the Lord says to the apostles, 'If the world hate you, you know that it hated me before it hated you.' (John 15:18) And the Apostle says, 'We are a sweet savor to God, among some the savor of death unto death, but among others the savor of life unto life.' (II Cor. 2:15,16) It is because of this that Scripture says of God, 'To whom He will He shows mercy,

and whom He will He hardens.' (Rom. 9:18) But God does not have mercy equally on all those to whom He shows mercy; nor does He harden equally all the men He hardens.

CHAPTER IX

Another question has to do with why the penalty of sin remains with us in this life after the sin itself has been blotted out. Although we do not propose to deal with this question now, I will say briefly that if the faithful were immediately transformed by baptism or martyrdom into the state of incorruption, merits would vanish and men would be saved without any merit (except for the first Christians, who believed without having any example). This would mean that faith and hope would have no value. But without faith and hope no one of the age of understanding can merit the Kingdom of God. Now, faith and hope belong to the class of things which cannot be seen. If men were to see people who had been converted to Christ immediately pass over into the state of incorruptibility, there would be no one who could will to reject such a visible happiness. Therefore, so that we might obtain the happiness which we desire in a more glorious way--namely, through the merit of faith and of hope--we continue in our present state as long as we remain in this life. Though our present state came about as a result of sin, it is no longer counted as sin.

Moreover, the happiness which Adam had in paradise before he sinned has not been promised to us through baptism and the Christian faith. What has been promised is the happiness which he was to have had after the celestial city, which is to be filled with men and angels, had become filled with the number of men who were to be taken up to make its number perfect. In the celestial city there will be no human procreation as there would have been in paradise.

So if converts to Christ immediately passed over into that state of incorruptibility, there would be no men left from among whom the perfect number could be gathered; for no one would be able to resist rushing for the happiness he would then see. I believe that the following statement of the Apostle refers to those who have worked justice through faith: 'And all these, approved by the witness of their faith, have not received the promise, since God is providing something better for us, so that they should not be made perfect without us.' (Heb. 11:39-40) If someone were to ask what is the better thing that God has provided for us out of their not having received the promise, I see no answer more fitting than what I have said above, namely: if the happiness promised to the just is not delayed for those who have already been approved, then merit would vanish in the lives of those who would learn of this fact through experience rather than through faith. Also, the process of human propagation by which we have been born would come to a halt, since all men would run off after that incorruptibility which they would then be able to see. Therefore, God provided a great good for us when He delayed reception of the promise for the saints who are already approved by the witness of their faith. He did this both that we might be propagated and that faith might remain possible, so that through faith we might merit the promise together with them and might be made perfect together with them at the same time.

There is another reason why the baptized and the martyrs do not immediately become incorruptible. Suppose there were a master who had offered to endow one of his servants with great honors at some future date. But then the master severely chastises his servant for some fault for which the servant is completely unable to render satisfaction by his own efforts. After this chastisement the master at a designated time is going to cast him into a dreadful prison where

he will be afflicted with grievous punishments. Suppose further that there is someone else who is influential with the master and who reconciles the servant by making satisfaction for him. Now the stripes, which the guilty servant deservedly received before satisfaction was rendered and while he was still at fault, are not wiped out; but the larger torments which he has not yet been made to suffer, are averted by the reconciliation which occurs beforehand. And the honors, which he was going to receive in due time had he not sinned and which he was going to be deprived of after sinning had he not been reconciled--these honors are given to him without alteration, as originally planned, because of the complete satisfaction. If he had been disinherited of these honors before reconciliation (as he was to be irreparably disinherited after he was at fault, had he not been reconciled), then reconciliation would have been of no assistance. But since he could not be deprived of an honor which he did not yet have and which he should not have, reconciliation can occur before this disinheritance and prevent it, provided the servant while lying in the agony of his stripes and awaiting healing does two things: vow in word and in heart that he will improve and be faithful to his master, and, secondly, fulfill his vow.

This is analogous to the relationship between God and man. When human nature first sinned, it was lashed with a two-fold penalty. First, it would naturally produce as descendants only children of such character as we see being born; secondly, it would after this life be barred from the Kingdom of God, for which it had been created, and would be banished forever to Hell. This was to happen unless someone reconciled human nature, for human nature does not have the ability to reconcile itself. But the only one who can reconcile human nature is Christ. Human nature is born with sin and its penalty in

all infants who are naturally begotten. When human nature enters the state of reconciliation, the penalty which it received before reconciliation deservedly remains. But the torments which it was going to suffer in Hell are remitted for those whom Christ has redeemed. And the Kingdom of God into which men were to have been received in due time, after their sojourn in the earthly paradise, will be given to them provided they steadfastly persevere to the end in the faith which they promise in baptism.

CHAPTER X

Some men think that they can prove from experience that free choice can do nothing, for they see many people making an enormous effort to live a good life, but who by reason of some alleged impossibility obstructing them either have no success or, after having some success, irretrievably fall back. However, the fact that some men think this way does not destroy what we have rationally demonstrated, namely, that free choice is capable of accomplishing something with the aid of grace. I think the fact that those who make this great effort either do not make any progress, or, having made some progress, fall back, is due not to an impossibility but to an obstacle--which is sometimes grave and other times easily overcome. It is very often our habit to say about what we can perform only with difficulty that it is impossible for us. But whoever considers any movement of his own will, shall see from his own situation that he can never desert uprightness of will, which he has received by grace, unless he wills something else which he cannot will at the same time he is willing uprightness. He certainly does not do this through a lack of ability to keep uprightness--the very ability which constitutes freedom of choice. Rather he wills this other thing because he lacks the will to keep uprightness. He does not essentially lack the will for uprightness, but he lacks it because

willing something other than uprightness drives out the will for uprightness.

CHAPTER XI

Since the foregoing consideration refers above all to the will, I think it will be worthwhile to say something further about the will. In our bodies we have five separate senses and also various other members, each of which we use like instruments. Our members and our senses are all adapted to their own particular use. For example, our hands are suited for grasping, our feet for walking, our tongues for speaking, and our sight for seeing. In the same manner there are certain powers within the soul, which the soul uses as instruments in fulfilling its appropriate functions. There is, for instance, reason in the soul, which the soul uses as an instrument for reasoning; there is also will, which it uses for willing. Now, reason and will do not comprise the whole soul, but each is something in the soul. Inasmuch as every instrument has its nature, its aptitudes (aptitudines), and its uses, let us distinguish within the will (according to the categories we have just drawn) the instrument, its aptitudes, and its uses. The aptitudes of the will we can call affections, or dispositions (affectiones). For the instrument of willing is obviously affected by its aptitudes. For this reason, when the human soul strongly wills something, it is said to be disposed to will that thing, or to will that thing affectionally.

The word 'will' may be used equivocally to refer to three different things. There is, first, the instrument of willing, secondly, the affection, or disposition, of the instrument, and thirdly, the use of the instrument. The instrument of willing is that power of the soul which we use for willing--just as reason is the instrument of reasoning which we use when we reason, and sight is the instrument of seeing which we use when we see. The affection, or disposition, of the instrument is that by which the instrument is so disposed to will some-

thing that when this thing comes to mind, even when the person does not reflect on it, he either wills it immediately or for its own proper time. For example, the instrument of willing is so disposed to will good health that as soon as this comes to mind, even if the person does not reflect on it, he wills it immediately. And the will is so disposed to will sleep that when it comes to mind, even if the person does not reflect on it, he wills it for its own proper time. Never is the instrument of willing disposed to will sickness or to will never to sleep. In the same way, the instrument of the just man's will is, even while sleeping, so disposed to will justice that when he thinks of justice, he immediately wills it. Finally, the use of the instrument of will is something we have only when we reflect upon the thing we are willing.

The word 'will' is used to refer to all three of these: the instrument of willing, its affection, and its use. We call the instrument 'will' in cases where we say that we direct the will toward various objects, such as toward willing to walk, and toward willing to sit, and toward willing now this, now that. Man always possesses this instrument even though he does not always use it--just as he has the power of sight, i.e., the instrument of seeing, even when (in his sleep, for instance) he is not using it. When he does use his sight, he directs it sometimes toward seeing the sky, sometimes toward seeing the earth, and other times toward seeing other things. In the same way we always possess reason, that is, the instrument of reasoning. We are not always using reason; but when we do use it we direct it toward different objects. Secondly, the affection of the instrument of willing is also called 'will.' This usage occurs when we say that man always possesses the will for his own well-being. For here what we call will is the affection of that instrument by which a man wills well-being. In this way we say that a saint continually

has the will to live justly, even when he is sleeping and not thinking about it. When we say that one person has more of the will to live justly than another person, the only will we are referring to is the affection of that instrument by which he wills to live justly. For the instrument is not greater in one person and less in another. Lastly, the use of this instrument is also called 'will' when someone says 'I now have the will for reading,' that is, 'I now want to read'--or says 'I now have the will for writing,' that is, 'I now want to write.' For just as seeing is using the sight which is the instrument of seeing, and just as its use is actual seeing, or sight, (at least in the cases where 'sight' signifies the same thing that 'seeing' does, for 'sight' can also signify the instrument of sight), so also willing is using the will which is the instrument of willing, and its use is the willing which occurs only when we think of what we are willing.

Now, the will understood as the instrument is only one thing; that is, in a man the instrument of willing is only one thing, just as reason is only one thing, only a single instrument. But the will understood as that by which the instrument is affected has a double aspect. For just as sight has many aptitudes--such as the aptitude to see light, and through light to see figures, and in the figures to see color--so the instrument of willing has two aptitudes, which I call affections, or dispositions. One of these affections is for willing that which is beneficial (commoditatem), the other is for willing uprightness. For the will as instrument wills nothing except uprightness or what is beneficial. Whatever else it wills, it wills for the sake of one of these. And even when a man is mistaken in thinking that what he wills serves one of these ends, he nevertheless believes that it does. By the affection to will what is beneficial, a man always wills happiness and being happy. By the

affection to will uprightness he wills uprightness and being upright, or just. For the sake of what is beneficial he wills certain things, such as farming or laboring, in order to obtain the means to sustain life and health, which he regards as benefits. For the sake of uprightness he wills certain things, such as the toil of study, so that he may know aright--that is, so that he may live justly. And finally, as we have already explained, the will understood as the use of our oft-mentioned instrument is actual only in those cases where the person reflects on what he wills. The divisions of this will are manifold; but we shall not deal with them now, though perhaps we shall return to them later.

Thus, 'willing,' like 'seeing,' has several meanings. For the man who uses his sight and also the man who has the aptitude to see but does not use it, are both said to see. In the same manner, the man who uses the instrument of willing with deliberation on what he wills and the man who does not use it are both said to will, for the latter still has the affection, or aptitude, of willing.

That the word 'will' indicates the instrument of willing, its affection, and its use can also be recognized from the following consideration. If we can at the same time both affirm that a just man, even when he is sleeping and not reflecting on anything, has the will to live justly, and deny that an unjust man has this will when he is sleeping, then we are denying of the unjust man the same will we are affirming in the just man. But obviously, when we declare that the will to live justly is not in the unjust man who is sleeping, we are not denying that he has within him the will which I have called the instrument. For every man, asleep or awake, always has that will. Moreover, the will that is in the just man in the manner described above can only be

said to be the will that leads him away from evil. This will, then, cannot be the instrument; instead it is the will by which the instrument is affected. Furthermore, it is obvious that the will as use is never in a man when he is asleep (unless he is dreaming). For this reason, when we say that the will to live justly is in a just man while he is sleeping, we do not understand this to mean the use of the will. The will as affection, then, is neither the will as instrument nor the will as use. And everyone knows also that the will as instrument is different from the will as use, for when I say that I do not have the will to write, no one takes this to mean that I do not have the instrument for so willing. We may conclude, therefore, that 'will' may mean variously an instrument, an affection, a use.

The instrument of will moves all the other instruments which we freely move--both those instruments that are a part of us (such as our hands, our tongue, our sight) and those that are independent of us (such as a pen or an axe). Furthermore, it causes all our voluntary actions; and it also moves itself by its affections. Hence, we can say that the instrument moves itself. Now, I said that the instrument of will causes all voluntary actions. But when the matter is considered carefully, we find that it is more accurate to say that God causes everything which human nature or the human will does, for He creates the nature and the instrument of willing together with its affections, without which the instrument does nothing.

CHAPTER XII

A man's every merit, whether good or evil, derives from one or the other of the two affections, which we have called wills. These two wills differ from each other in that the will for what is beneficial is inseparable from the instrument of will; whereas the will for uprightness (as I said above)

was originally separable from the instrument of will--separable, that is, for the angels and for our first parents, and still separable today for those men who are still in this life. These affections also differ in that the will which is the affection for willing what is beneficial is not itself the object that it wills, whereas the will which is the affection for willing uprightness is uprightness. For certainly no one wills uprightness unless he possesses uprightness; and no one can will uprightness except by means of uprightness. But it is clear that this uprightness belongs to the will considered as instrument. We mean this uprightness when we define 'justice' as 'uprightness of will kept for its own sake.' And this uprightness is the truth of the will wherein the Lord charges Satan with not having remained steadfast, as I wrote in the dialogue Concerning Truth.

We must now consider how the merits of men--both those merits that lead to salvation and those that lead to damnation--proceed from the two wills which I have called aptitudes, or affections. In itself, uprightness is the cause of no evil, but is the mother of every good merit. This uprightness aids the spirit in its striving against the flesh (Gal. 5:17) and delights 'in the law of God after the inward man' (Rom. 7:22), that is, in accordance with the spirit which strives against the flesh. Even if evil sometimes seems to follow from uprightness, it does not really proceed from it but from something else. Because of their uprightness the apostles were a sweet savor to God. (II Cor. 2:15) But the fact that the apostles were also a savor of death unto death for evil men, did not proceed from the justice of the apostles but from the wickedness of those evil men. Now, the affection for willing what is beneficial is not always evil, but it is evil when it gives assent to the flesh in its striving against the spirit. (Gal. 5:17)

CHAPTER XIII

In order that we may understand this matter more clearly, we must investigate how this will for what is beneficial became so corrupt and prone to evil. For we cannot believe that God created our first parents with such an affection toward evil. When I stated earlier that human nature became corrupt and acquired the appetites of brute animals because of sin, I did not explain how such a will arose in man; for base appetites are one thing, but a base will that assents to them is another. I think, therefore, that we must inquire how such a will became the lot of man.

The cause of such a will shall quickly become apparent to us if we consider the original condition of rational nature. The intention of God was to make rational nature just and happy so that it could enjoy Him. But it was able to be neither just nor happy without the will for justice and happiness. Now the will for justice is itself justice; but the will for happiness is not itself happiness, because not everyone who has the will for happiness has happiness. By common consent, happiness is understood to include a sufficient degree of beneficial things, without there being need for more. And this is true whether one is thinking of the happiness of the angels or the happiness of Adam in paradise. Although the happiness of the angels exceeds that which belonged to Adam in paradise, we cannot for this reason deny that Adam had happiness. For the fact that one object is very hot and is not at all cold does not exclude the existence of a second object even hotter. Or the fact that an object is very cold and is not at all hot does not mean that it cannot get even colder. By the same token, there was nothing to prevent Adam from being happy in paradise and from having no needs, even though the angels' happiness was greater than his. Having less of a thing than someone else does

is not the same as being in need. For being in need consists in being deprived of something which one ought to have; but there was no deprivation in Adam. Where there is need, there is wretchedness. God created rational nature to know and to love Him, and He would not have made it wretched without some blame on its part. So then, He created man happy and in need of nothing. Rational nature received at once (1) the will for happiness, and happiness, (2) the will for justice (i.e., it received uprightness, which is justice), (3) and free choice, without which it could not have kept justice.

God has so ordained the two wills, or affections, that the instrument of will should use the affection for justice to order and govern one's choices under the guidance of the spirit, which is also called mind, or reason; and that it should use the other affection to will obedience without bringing any disadvantage. Indeed, God gave happiness to man (not to mention the angels) for his benefit, but He gave man justice for His own honor. He gave justice, however, in such a way that man was able to desert it. But He also provided that if man did not desert it but persistently kept it, he would merit elevation to fellowship with the angels; but if he did desert it, he would subsequently have no way to recover it on his own. Moreover, if he did forsake it, he would fail to attain the happiness of the angels and, furthermore, would be deprived of the happiness which he did possess. As a further consequence, he would fall into the likeness of brute animals and become subject with them to corruption and to the appetites we have often mentioned. Nevertheless, the will for happiness would still remain, so that through a need of the good things which he had lost, he would be justly punished with dire wretchedness. Since the will actually did desert justice, it has lost its happiness. And the will, which received the good of happiness for its own benefit, became fervent with desire

for benefits it cannot now keep from willing because it cannot now have those true, but lost, benefits which are suitable for rational nature. In this condition the will turns itself to the false benefits sought by brute animals at the urging of their appetites. When the will wills these false benefits inordinately, then it either rejects uprightness, so that it does not receive it when offered, or else the will casts uprightness away once it has been received. But when the will wills these benefits within proper bounds, it does not shun or cast away uprightness.

Insofar as the instrument of will has being, it is created good and just and with the power to keep the uprightness it has received. But it is made evil through free choice. It is then evil not insofar as it has being but insofar as it has been made unjust by the absence of the justice which it ought to have at all times but which it freely deserted. The will henceforth became powerless to will justice which it had deserted. For through free choice one cannot will justice when he does not have it, although he can keep justice when he does have it. Moreover, the will for what is beneficial, which was created good insofar as it has being, becomes something evil; that is to say, it is made unjust because it is not subordinated to justice, without which it ought not to will at all. Therefore, the instrument of will freely became unjust; yet insofar as it possessed any capability after it had deserted justice, it was necessarily unjust and a servant of injustice. For it cannot return to justice by its own efforts. However, without justice the will can never actually be free, because without justice the natural freedom of choice is useless. It is even made a servant to its own affection for what is beneficial, for once justice is taken away, a man can will only what this affection wills. I maintain that both the instrument and its affection actually will; for the instrument and the

affection are both will, and so there is nothing incogruous in saying that both of them will. For it is true both that the instrument wills by its own affection and that the affection wills through the instrument by which it wills (just as 'seeing' refers both to the man who sees and also to the power of sight by which he sees). Hence, it is not absurd for us to say that the affections of the soul's instrument of will, are, as it were, the instruments of that instrument--for the instrument of will operates only through its affections. So then, after the will has lost its 'instrument' for willing justice--that is, after the will has lost its uprightness--there is no way that it can will justice unless uprightness is restored to it by grace. And since the will ought not to will anything unless it can do so justly, whatever it wills without uprightness, it wills unjustly. As for the appetites which the Apostle calls the flesh, or concupiscence, they are not evil or unjust insofar as they have being; it is only insofar as they are found in rational creatures, where they do not belong, that they are called unjust. They are not evil or unjust in brute animals, because that is where they ought to be.

CHAPTER XIV

From all that I have said one can now see that man does not always possess the justice he ought, because he has no power or means to obtain or recover justice. It is also clear now that God causes good works solely through His own goodness, since He creates the will with free choice and gives it justice, by which to work good deeds. But the evil works God causes are attributable solely to man's blame, because God would not cause them if he did not will to do them. Nonetheless, God is responsible for the fact that they occur, since He is the One who placed in man the will which man uses without justice. But it is man's fault that his deeds are evil, because God created in man a will

with freedom of choice, and He bestowed justice on it, so that it would always will justly. So evil deeds are man's fault, because he deserted justice when he could have kept it. In regard to good works, God is responsible for the goodness which they have qua being, and also the goodness they have qua justice. But in regard to evil works, God is responsible only for the goodness which is theirs insofar as they have being; He is not responsible for the evil which is theirs through the absence of the justice they ought to have, which absence is not something positive. When man does good, he is responsible for the fact that his deeds are not evil. He is responsible because when able to desert justice and do evil, he did not desert, but kept uprightness through free choice, with the aid of grace--both the grace which is first given and that which comes subsequently. And when man does evil, he is responsible for the fact that his deeds are evil, because he does them of his own accord, that is, by his own unjust will.

I think that I can now fittingly bring to a close this treatise on these three difficult questions, a treatise which I began in the hope that God would help me. If what I have said here should prove to be a sufficient answer to any who might be inquiring about these matters, I cannot take the credit myself, because it was not I, but the grace of God with me, that accomplished this work. I will say this, however. There was a time when I was inquiring about these things, that my mind was wavering back and forth in its search for the right understanding of these problems. If someone had told me then the things that I have now written in this treatise, I would have thanked him, for he would have fully satisfied me. Accordingly, I was very much pleased with what God disclosed to me in this matter. And I thought that others would be similarly pleased if I wrote this treatise; for what I have freely received I wish to make freely available to those who are still seeking.

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